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c;ONvERGENCE OF EXTERNAL rm\TER INTERESTS IN THE
INDIAN OCEAN: PATTERN FOR CONFRONTATION
A study of the common interests of internal and external
states tn tb8 Indian Ocean. and identUicat:lcn of the methods,
and their potentiaJ_ for confrontation, employed by @xternal
pm\Ters in pursuit of the:Lr intere sts. The histor:ical i:nter~
ests of external powers in the Indian Ocean are depict~d.
Common :i.nterests, which hav@ commanded the attention of
internal states and external powers during recent years, are
identifip.d. The :rndian Ocean is divided into J~ive regiOl'-lS,
each region characterized by the aforementioned common inter-
ests. The assets, mutual relations and interests of the lit-
toral states comprising each rer,ion are described. The
interests and methods of projecting these interests by China,
Japar', TlJestern Europe, Soviet UnLon and the United States
are delineated. The paper find.s that externa1 power lnter~
ests are competing at an incr'easing rate in the Indian Ocean
area. As the interests converge, the potential for confron-
tation, particularly between the United States and .1.i.U.S sia,
resulting from ~ethods of operation and uncontrollable events,
increases. U.S. policy makers must clearly define If.S.-
Indian Ocean objectives, to maximize effective utiliz~tio~
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EXTERNAL STATES AND THE INDIAN OCEAN:
THE POTENTTAL FOR CONFRONTATION
CHAPTER I
INDIAN OCEAN OVERVIEtN
Introduction. Historically the United States has com-
cen~rated its maritime interests in the Atlantic and Pacific
Oc.ans. Only si.nce 196'1 j have events caused the U . t dn1 e
States to direct an increasingly large proportion of i'ts
a ttent1'on to th"" :ndl-arl Ocean. Th . t .
• v ~, .us 1- 18 appropriate to
ask the questions j d.oes the United States have any national
intorests in the Indian Ocean and what elements of the Indian
Ocean might command U.S. interest?
Literature offers very little information about the
Indian Ocean as a whole j 'with on]y a couple of significant
work.s appearing in the English language during the past
1
twenty years. Similarly, exploration of the ocean area
was practically nonexistent until the JnttJrnat10nal Indj.an
Ocean Expedition, conducted from 1959-1965. The purposes of
the expedition, involving scientists from some thirty nations,
were to gather inforlLation and reproduce a IT.ap of the indian
Ocean floor j to trac}" Cl~rrents, to explore the 11ving and
nonliving resources of' the ocean and seabed, and to study
2
the weather conditions throughout the area.
1
None 01' these e:fforts was devoted to any stratee;y cor:-
siderations of the Indian Ocean. However, since Britain an-
nounced its intention to withdraw militarily frorr the Indian
Ocean i.:.l the mjd-sixties, and essentially transformed this
intention into reality by the end of 1971, interests of a
number of nations external to the Indian Ocean steadl1y in-
creased. This is part:LcularlY true since early 1968, when
the Soviet Union comn:enced a ded.icated, faj'rly sizable and
almost continuous naval presence i~ the Indian Ocean region.
Since the announced British plan to withdraw, a sie;nifica.,lt
increase in printed matter has be~n published about the
I~;ldian Ocean region. Tv1v.ch of it 'is devoted to enurnerating,
evaluatine; and analyzine; Soviet intentions in the Indian
Ocean. PertainL'lg to the Soviet naval presence, hypotheses
range :from eventual control of Middle East oil assets, sup~
port of an eff'ort to acquire Asian markets and promo-te Soviet
diplomatic stature, and con tainment of' China! s influ,ence
throughout the aroa. 3
A Dumber of conferences were devoted to the Indian
Ocean region dUTing the past year. Perhaps the most 8xten-
sive was the conference conducted by The Center fOT Strategic
and International Studies on 18 and 19 March 1971. Discus-
sions of the effects of Briti,sh withdrawal and increaSed
Soviet naval presence were conducted by eleven countries,
~
and over three hundred persons attGnded the conf~rence.
2
Similarly the United. states Governrr:ent has increasingly
directed its attention to t~is region" as indicated by Ui.e
Bearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy
and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreivn Af-
fa: . s, House of' Reprosc-mtatives, conducted 20, 22, 27 and
5
28 tjuly 1971.
What are the salient geographical and historical fea-
tures of the Indian Ocean? Do interests exist which aLe
common to :Lnternal states and external powers; and if so,
can geographical regions be designated aocording to these
common interests? ~fuat are the assets, :Lnterests and mutual
relations of the littoral states? Which external powers are
competing in the Indian Ocean at present, and what are th~ir
primary i.nterests? As Soviet and. U. S. interests converge in
the area, what potential confrontations are likely to evolve?
Each of these questions is examined in the following chapterG.
Geography. 'rhe Indian Ocean is the third largest ocean
in the worJd ... comprisi.ng an area of 28,350,000 square mj_les.
It j.8 bordered on three sides: East Africa to the west, South
Asia on the north, and the island chain of Southeast Asia in
the east. Another description of the Indian Ocean identilies
it as contained withi~ a perimeter stretching from the north-
ern limit of the Red Sea south to Cape Agulhas, South Africa,
along the tv.,renty degree s east 1 one;i tude line to the Antarctic ~
3
eastward to Australia and Tasmanl'a
• J north to the coast of
Asia., and back to the point of' origin. It is conElidered an
ocean of bays, the more prominent ones heing the Bay of
B~nf,al, Persian GUlf, and Red Sea. 6
The Indian Ocean contains many islands, most of them
economically unimpressive. Yet many are positioned in po-
tentially strategic locations, especially when one plays the
"flfhat if" game of l"orld e-.~Te_nts. V"ll' "dA ~. - 1 lers proVl £8 a most
interesting d.escriptive and historical picture of' many of'
these islands. 7 Table I lists the principal islands and
island. groups, depicts their location, status, estilated
size or numbers and population. Many of these islands and
j.sland groups aTe discussed in greater detail in the regional
breakdown of the littoral states,
The Indian Ocean is primarily a tropical body of water,
relatively free from fog, and free from drift ice and similar
obstructions to navigation. Its sale open end, the south,
provides it with a u.nique wind pattern. Trade "vinds prevail
in the latitudes closest to the equator. The northern hemi-
spr.ere winds, which b1o'll to the north, tend to be :favorable;
but the southern herrrlsphere counterpart ltJiJ 1 occasiona11y
cause severe hurricanes. These cyclonic storms can be a
serious problem in the ~ndian Ocean, particularly in the
west/central area near Mauritius from November th:r-ough March,
. h . d 't' th r l_ocatl' 0118... throughout the IndianIhg Wln S CX1S lD 0 e -
)-1-
Ocean, particularly off the Cape of Good Hope and in the
vicinity of the southern most islands. The area cncom-
passed by the forty and fifty deBree south latitudss is
[3
respected for its fierce storms.
The Indian Ocean is climat,ized by a rigid system of'
monsoons or seasons, particularly north of the $quator. The
two monsoons are the southwest (summer) and northeast (wi0t8r),
which affect a stretch of lt1ater and land from the Mczambique
Channel to the Bay of' Bengal and arc across the Arabjan Sea
between their two terminal points. Eaoh monsoon lasts for
approximately half of the year. The southwest predominates
b etwe8n t/lay and, Septerrber, during which time it carrie s
moisture from tho ocean over land, reSUlting in regUlar and
heavy rainfall. The Dortheast monsoon is predorr:inant bet1,.....een
November and March, resulting in the transport of cool, dry
air from the land to the ocean. During the months of .une
through August, heavy lt1eather engulfs the northeastern Indian
Ocean coastline, significantly curtailing coastal shipping
operations. '1'he northeast monsoon creates an. opposite ef'-
feet, is characterized by fair weather, and permits unir1 -
hibited shipping throughout the northern hemisphere of tbe
ocean, that area affected by both monsoons. 9
Local conditions prevail in other areas, partjcularly
those of the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. Each o:f these regions
is often exceedingly uncomfortable, particularly durine; the
5
summer months. The main causes of this discomfiture are
excessive temperatures~ often reaching 120 degrees fahren-
hei't, high humidity and d"bilitating sano storms. 10
Currents also are influenced by the monsoon bchavjoral
pattern, reversing in direction every six months. Perhaps
the Somali current, which flovvs along the northeastern coast
O:l Ai'rica between iviadagascar and the Socotra IsJ_ands, is the
most impressive. It is about one hundred miles wide, exists
:from the surface to depths in thousands of feet, and often
1
11
attains a ve ocity of seven knots.
A tremendous rridoceanic submarine ridge runs roughly
north to south, entering through the Gu]_f' of Aden, gradually
alterj,ng course frorr east to south and proceeding in a
southerly direction, with the ridge center located alcng the
sixty-sevsn degrees east longitude line. East of Madagascar,
the ridge splits into southeq,st and southwest paths, Tl'lhicb
eventually pass south of Australia and South Africa respec-
tively. Portions of the ridge achi~ve a width of 1,500 miles
and heights of 10,000 feet above the average 16,000 foot depth
of the abyssal plains. The ridec is part of the 'd'orldwide
Mid-Oceanic Ridge, consisting of undersea mountains and
valleys which run through the centers of thG ocean basins and
12
extend about 40,000 miJ.es.
The ocean is comprised of three seas (Red, Arabian,
And.aman), five primary gulfs (Persian, Oman, Suez, AClen,
6
Aqtlaba) and the Bay of Bengal. ~~ese bodies of water are
perhaps most important w:Lth regard to the role they playas
access passageways to and from the Indian Ocean.
Jnhe principal access l/iays to the Indian Ocean are:
Cape of Good Hope around South A rica; Suez CanaJ (when
open) via the M8diteTranean Sea, Gulf of' Suez, Red Sea, and
Gulf' of Aden ; Strait of' !'-'ialacca; Sunda Strait, Lombok Strait
and a number of lesser candidates north of Australia; aDd
around Australia to th~ south. Today the dominant entry/
de-parture routes pass through the Strait of Malacca in thJ~
east and around South Africa in the west. Table.II depicts
the more prominent straits s(3Tv1ng the Indian Ocean.
Marine Resources. Compared with the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans, the Indian Ocean contains relatively few living and
nonliving resources. Most o~ the resources which. ar8 present
are not extensively exploited, the exception being offshore
oil in the Persian Gulf and. Gulf of Suez. Oil prod'uction
there is Increasing. Fisheries have developed. slowly, be-
cause of the lack of dense population along some of the
coasts adjacent to the most productjve fjshing areas. In
1967 -' cl",;ly two ndllion tons of fish were caugbt compared
'....,i th twenty and twenty-seven million tons in the :WaciSic and
Atlantic Oceans respectively. The principal countrie:;;. in-
volved in flsl1inr, the lndian Oc.ean a'y'e India (l.4 million
7
tons), Pakistan (.4 million tons) and South Africa (.9 mil-
Ijon tons), but much of' South Africals catch was in the
Atlantic. Most of the people of the Jittol"al scatec eat
very 11ttle fish, and Ind:La, Pakistan and Iran have recently
bogun to export fish. The Russ:i.an and ,Japanese fishing
fleets are increasing their efforts in the Tr:dian Ocoan, and
the assistance they are providing to a few of the littoral
states may result hi. more local exploi tatioD of this rC'lsource.
A small but increasing amount of shrimping is done tn the
Persian GuJf area, and some interest is devoted to shel~s,
pearls, and coral in the Red Sea and Persian GUlf. l3
Nonliving resourceS, with the exception of the afore-
mentioned offshore oil reseTves, and a few chemical plants
utiJizing salt deposits, are not extensive. Some deep holes
in the Red Sea containing hot, very salty (ten times the
average) water were found to contain rich concentrations of
14 tiron, copper, silver and gold. Thus far technoloe;y has no
perrr:itted efficient recovery of those resources. Expeditions
devoted to scientific research have yieJded increased knowl-
cage of the Indian Ocean, such as the discovery of upwelling
areas in the A.rabian Sea and. Bay of Bengal that were ten to
t t t · es more ~utritious than average seawater. This afld,wen y lm~ J.J





- lscory. A historical review of the Indian Ocean re-
veals that once external po'tvers began sailing in its \lJaters,
externaJ dominance commenced' OVAr most of the :Lnternal states.
For nearly five centuries, European maritime powers retained
almost exclusive control of the Indian Ocean.
Portugal introduced European influence into the Indian
Ocean :'Ln ] 1.1-98, when Vasco da Gama sailed from Portugal to
Calicut, Ind ia, via the west coast of Africa., Cape of Good
Hope and East African coast. The Portugue.se ip.J!nediately
exercised contro] of thE; Indian Ocean, A number of sea bat-
tles occurred behmen Fortuguese and Indian fleets, generally
ending in a draw, India, wjth assistance from Egyptian and
Turkish allies, and the brave and efficient efforts of Admiral
Kunjoli II , used its smaller but faster vessels to counter
the more powerfUl Portuguese ships. Eventually Portugal
gained control of the northern Indian Ocean defense points
of Socotra Island, Ormus (Persian Gulf), Goa (India) and
l' alucca (Malaysia), primarily through the efforts of Af'fonso
16
Albuquerque, a capable statesman and administrator. Spo-
radic Portuguese/Indian encounters continu d du_ring the l::iOOs,
but din not significantly reduce Portugal's control of the
area.
Early in the 1600s, the Dutch established a presence on
.Java, gradually expanded to the ,,,rest, and captured tlia1ucca
l'nfl'ltration continued west, resulting inin 1641, The Dutch
9
the occupation of Colombo~ Ceylon, in 1654 and subsequent
excursions into 88,st Africa. By 16'70 ~ Portuguese Marl tir:1C
]7
po1;,rer had vardshpd from the Il!dlan OC2R.Yl.
During the time from 1650-1750, a series of British,
P)"ench~ and Dutch projections into the Indian Ocean met with
varying degrees of success. Indiars increased naval strength
was reasonably successful in neutralizing British and. Dutch
clforts to secure la_nd bases' -in Indl'a. Pr'- .] th h th~ lmarl y roug, _C
efforts and ability of Admiral Kanhotji Angre, the Indian
fleet consiBtently countered British, Dutch and Portuguese
nava actions directed against India.
L"uring the period 1750-rT80 the Brjtish secured control
of the Bay of Bengal area. The Fnmch, who had acquired
te.rritorial possessions in I'-1adagascar, JVlauri tius, and La
Reunion Islands, conducted a number of naval battles with
the British in the Bay of Bengal area. Although blessed with
a great naval leader, Pierre Andre de Su~freD Saint Tropez,
the lacl\. of subordinate cooperation and immediate base facil-
ities to support fleet operations near India, restricted the
. _ 12,
F h to l imited and short-term success against the BTltJ-sh.rer..c .L
lJu.ring the latter 17005, I3ri tish povmr proved dominant, and
Britain acquired control of Ceylon, Malucca, Mauritius,
South Africa, Aden, Ormuz and :i.:n 1822.1 Singapore. IN'hen the
French fleet was annihilated at ~rafalfar in 1805, the
became t v...e only naval -nower i!l the world~ and.British r:-:avy II r
10
thus C'ommenced 136 years of unchallenged supremacy in the
1°
.." lIB • t' h rake. 11- ./Indian Ocean, co:-mnonly ref erren to as a rl 18 -
During the 19th century, the British consolidated their
Indian Ocean empire. Absolute control of tne primary en-
trance points--Sucz/Hed Sea route, Cape of Good Hope, strait
of Malacca--was achieved. and external powers were excluded
20from the area. British trad.e, primarily through the East
India Company, flourished throughout the area. Opening of
the Suez. Canal in 1869 served to strengthen Britain's logi:J-
tics and reinforcement capability in the I:ndian Ocean by re-
duell!€!; the 1,.mter route to India from 10,500 nautica miles
around the Cape of Good Hope to 5,900 nautical miles through
the Mediterranean Sea. By 1890, British possessions through-
out the Ind.ian Ocean consisted of South A.frica, Kenya, Brit-
ish Somaliland, Egypt, South Arabia, Trucial states, Iraq,
Pakistan, India, ~1a]aysj.a and Singapore.
From 1890 to the 19308, colonization efforts, primarily
1n Africa, were conducted by a number of European states.
Spec:lf1cally, Germany controlled ;rangarjy1ka a~ld Zanzibar,
Italy--Somaliland and Er.i trea, Fra.nce- -Madagascar and Jibuti. 21
iNorld War J ended Germany r s influence in the Indian Ocean.
Between the:; wars, Italy reinforced its position in Eritrea
and Italian Somaliland, huilding naval bases at Massawa,
Eritrea, and Mogadishu, Somaliland. Italy hoped to control
the northwest approach to the Indian Ocean. Franc.L '"_ "e vurnf)~
11
Diego Suarez, Madagascar, into a strong naval base, and as the
,Jananese threat increased, Britain significantly streng't:-lened
"
Si.ngapore~
During the middle 193~, Italy formulated plans and con-
ducted operations to conquer Ethiopia. For many months I-league
of Nations action vascillated and eventually Italy attacked
Ethiopia in force. Economic and military sanctions against
Italy were applied by the League, but not until Italy had OCCU-
22
pi,ed Ethiopia.
Japanese conquests expanded rapidly in the late 19308 and
1940/41 with the Malayan Peninsula, Indonesia and finally Singa-
pore falling into Japanese hands. Only a few naval engagem0.nts
occurr~d in the Indian Ocean during World War II. In 1942, a
sizable Japanese naval force entered the Indian Ocean, des,troyed
most of the British fleet at Trincomalee, Ceylon, and quickly
withdrew to confront a U.S. naval force in the Coral 8ea. 23
Japanese submarines destroyed a considerable amount of shipping,
primarily in the Arabian Sea, and the British malntained a small
nav~l force at Diego Suarez, Madagascar. Japan eventually oc-
cupied Burma and the Nicobar/Andaman Island group and threatened
Ceylon before halting her expansion into the Indian Ocean. The
western Indian Ocean did serve as an important supply pipeline
to Russia, via the Persian GUlf, Karachi, Iran and the Caspian
Sea, and to China, via India's eastern ports. 24
12
Since World War 11, the British colonial empire has rapidly
vanished, as the force of nationalism resulted in most of the
-African, South Asia and East Asia countries gaining their inde-
pendence. The British Commonwealth still exists, but it is not
a pO~lerful organization, and its members often pursue their own
national interests quite independent O'f Cornmonwcaltn tic=s. Al-
though the members consult together on many matters, various
alliances and regional interests hav€ replaced any obligation
25
or interest in supporting a common policy.
Britain still retained a defense posture throughout the
Indian Ocean, with its arc of facilities ccmprised of Singapore,
Persian Gulf' area, and Aden. However, qw:~stions WeT!? debated in
England concerning the purposes and capabilities of such outposts,
particularly as their support costs became an increasing finan-
cial burden. In 1967, the decision was made to withdraw forces
from Aden, Singapore and most of the Persian Gulf area by the
26
end oi' 1971.
The preceding brief summary of Indian Ocean history merely
attempted to indicate the more signif'icant events 1-' h h~ WnlC_ .ave
occurred in the Indian Ocean area. Maritime rule of the area
by external powers introduced and sustained imperialism therein
for nearly five hundred years. It enabled Britain to dominate
~he region for 150 years.
13
CHAPTER II
INTERESTS OF INTERNAL STATES OF THE INDIAN OCEAN
The littoral states of the Indian Ocean area can be
assigned to regions, each one representing a primary or set
of' primary interests which distinguish it from the others.
?he interests specified appear to encompass most of the per-
tinent interc:sts in the area which have conunanded the atten-
tion of both the internal states and external powers during
recent years. Table III depicts the five Indian Ocean re-
gians and their associated primary interests.
The interests selected relate to each region in a geo-
graphic context--that is the immediate events associated with
each interest occur in the specified area. The various forms
of self pro,jection utilized by the external powers with re-
spect to each interest are primarily focused in the related
regIons. Certainly side effects occur and many of the lit-
toral states are concerned with all or most of these interests
in varying degrees. 'For instance, the states of the "oil tl
region, Arabian PeninSUla/Persian Gulf area, are partially
dependent upon unrestricted passage of ships along the Cape
of Good Hope trade route, since a significant portion of
their oil is exported along that sea lane to Western Europe.
Similarly, economic development is an interest of all nations·
- ,
14
but relatively speaking this subject is of prime concprn to
the Wcatern region states, particularly the island terri-
tories therein.
A brief insight will be provided identifying the con-
cerns, ocean assets and naval/air capabilitie,s of the prin-
cipal states comprising each region, attempting to reveal the
significance of the primary interests to thesf' states.
If thpre is such a thing as a single common interest of
the majority of the states of the Indian Ocean, it was p~ob-
ably best stated at the Conference of Nonaligned countries
which met ir. Lusaka, Zambia" on 8-10 September 19'70. Usually
referred to as the Lusaka D@claration, one of the goals
pledged by the attendees reads as follows:
A declaration should be adopted calling upon all
States to consider and respect the Indian Ocean
as a zone of peace from which great power rival-
ries and competition as well as bases conceived
i~ the context of such rivalries and competition;
elther army, navy, or air force should also be
free of nuclear weapons. l
In addition the Conference urged the "adoption of a Declara-
tion of Principles on the peaceful uses 01- tl'le seabed and
the exploration and exp1oi.tation of its resources. 112
Thus the general theme of many of the littoral states
iE that the Indian Ocean should not become an area of' big
power competition and, perhaps, ultimately confrontation.
More realistically, they concede that th n . b;g\. ... powers are
15
t and that prevention of dominance by (j, single
already pres en , . -. .
external power is ptobably t'm: most suitable altE:rnative.
West Indian Ocean Region.
General Description. The Western region is com-
posed of four African stat~s; South Africa, Mozambique, Tan-
zania and Kenya plUS six western island areas, Malagasy Rp.-
public (Madagascar), Mauritius, Cornaro Islands, 1a Reunion,
Seychelles and the British Indian Ocean Territory (BlOT),
which consists of the Chagos Archipelago, Aldabra, Farquhar
and Deroches Islands. Tables IV and V are status charts which
provide a variety of informat~on about each territory.
Four primary interests pertaining to the region are eco-
nomic development, South Africa's status, trade routes around
the Cape of Good Hope, and potential island bases. Not all
of the interests are primary concerns of the littoral states
and territories, but each is important to the area as a whole
when p-xternal interests are also included.
Oertain events and situations seem to attract most of
the attention given to the W~stern region. The closing of
the Suez Canal in June 1967, significantly increased the ship-
ping activity a~ollild the Capp of Good Hop~. ~he policy of
apartheid maintained by the South Af'rican Govprnment has been
a particularly abrasive factor to th~ Black nations of the
16
area. A similar situation exists in Rhodc:sia. Mozambique,
which is controlled by the Portuguese, and South Africa are
utilized by Rhodesia as supply lanes, thwarting much of the
effp.ctiveness of the United "Nation's economic sanctions
levied against Rhodcsia. 3 Competition~ real or illusory,
among external powers for island bases throughout the Indian
Ocean, involves a whole set of Western island concerns.
These concerns vary with the islands, ranging from dependence
upon controlling or former cDntrolling states to regional
development problems. Each of these concerns is related to
the present economic dependence of these islands, and tte
II optimum" path or paths which should be selected to enhance
economic development in the future.
Development Status. All the states and territories
in the Western region are considered lesser developed coun-
tries With the exception of South Africa. They p0ssess rela-
tiveJ_y few resources~ tend to concentrate . ton agrlcul ur. and
light industry, but with very limited diversification.
Annual per capita income averages about one hundred
with only South Africa1s value 4~ppreciably higher.
dollars,
Marine Orientation. The continental shelf rarely
extends more than twenty n t' 1 'I'au lca ml E?S off' any coast, the
fe,'! exceptions being off central Mozambique, northwestern
Madagascar, and South Africa where the distances average
about forty nautical miles and occasionally extend to roughly
one hundred miles. The Seychelles Island grou~ possesses a
sizable shelf area, perhaps as large as 140,000 square nauti-
cal miles. South Africa 'is the only country in the Wp.stern
region exploiting fisheries resources, and most of its fish
are caught off its western coast. In 1970, South Africa
caught 1.5 million metric tons of fish, ranking in the top
ten countries of the world. Although Kenya, Tanzania and
Mauritius are expanding their fishing capability, only Tan-
zania exceeded one hundred thousand metric tons in 1970. 5
None of the states have discovered or developed significant
offshore mineral resources, although most are increasing
exploration of their shelfs. South Africa has the only siz-
able ocean fleet, but most of the ports have eXperienced
increased vessel arrivals since the closure of the Sue~
Canal. Prominent ports are few., however, wi tIl only Mom-
nassa, Kenya, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, Beria, and Lourenco
Marques, Mozambique, and Durban, East London, Port Eliza-
beth and Cape Town, South Africa so considered. 6 South
Africa and Mozambique handle the largest quantities of goodS
in tneir ports.
Mutual Relation~. The western islands, Malagasy Repub-
lic, Mauritius, Cornoro, I,a Reunion, Seychelles and BTOT
= ,
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have been called a bridge between Asia and Africa, primarily
. . t 1" eop}es Regl'onal cow~ercialbecause of thelr mlX ure 0 p. , • -
1 t · s mutually be.tween the islands and also with Africanre a,lon ,
states, has been inhibited primarily because of British and
French methods of control. Consequently the islands are al-
most totally dependent upon Britain and France for trade and
security matters. The tendency today is for more regional
trade, particularly with South Africa. It appears that
mutually profitable trade relations can transcend disap-
proval of government methods. The increased shipping around
the Cape has helped to stimulate the idea of regional co-
operation. Unfortunately most of thE; island shipping is con-
trolled by European organizations, who have not always acted
in the best interests of the islands. Ho-wever, there is a
general concern by most of the islands over the increased
Soviet naval presence) and the majority of these states and
territories support a continuing presence by Britain and
France. At present~ the islands provide Britain and France
with a few base facilities~ historically acquired~ which are
not heaVily utilized tOday.7 It is the uncertainty asso-
ciated with external po~er intentions and unknown forthcoming
events which make these potential bases most' t t'In eres,lng.
'I'he Black African states are adamant in their condemna-
tion of South Africa's polt,cloes.~ They interpret South Africars
request to Britain for increased military aid, as all effort to
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attain support for the policies of apartheid, and not con-
cern over the increased Soviet Indian Ocean presence. Tan-
zania's attitude, which summarizes the Black African states
1
viewpoints, supports the I.asaka Declaration 1 s plea for a
neutral Indian Ocean, but also recognizes Britain's interest
ill insuring the security of the ~hipping lanes. Rather than
have Britain support this L.'1te rest through inc reased aid to
South Africa, Tanzania Fecommended that Britain be provided
bases elsewhere in the area~ possibly in Madagascar or
Mauritius, in return for a reduction in British aid to South
Africa. Tanzania argues that this concept does not violate
the JJusaka D~claration, since historical precedence exists
for Britain's Indian Ocean presence.
8
The Union of South Africa is also very mueh concerned
wi th maintaining free trade routes around the Capt;, for
eighty percent of ~ts f .• orelgn trade is conducted through
Indian Ocean ports. S th Af .ou rlca is the only state in the
Western Region that possesses a moderate 'marltime force>
including a Navy which consists of six ASW frigates, three
with support helicopters, and apprOXimately 130 fighter/
bomber aircraft. South A;f'rica also possesses the industrial
capacity and transportation network necessary to sustain and
support military operations. mh~_ e remainder of the states
can only muster a few patrol vessels. eSB t' II~ en ~a y no air
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power and minimal logistic support. J Consequently for secu-
rity reasons, the reluctance of South Africa'B neighbors to
see it recelvc any additional aid is understandable.
The predominant force of influence in the area appearS
to be Britain's residu~l presence. Kenya, Tanzania~ South
Africa, Mauritius and Madagascar were all British possessions
for various periodS of time in the past, while BlOT and the
Seychelles remain so today. Coupled with the strong post-
'ItJorId Har II growth of nationalism, Portugal's control of
Mozambique, South Africa's apartheid policies and the
islands' contribution, yet to be dct~rmin8d,thewestern In-
dian Ocean Region ~merges as a complex area, certain to
undergo more changes before achieving stabi1ity and pros-
perity.
Northwest Indian Ocean Region.
General Description. The Northwest region is com-
poSed of five African states d'an territories; Somali Repub-
1ic_, Ethiopia, Sudan, United A bra Republic~ or Egypt, and
Afars and the Issas (forme 'I .r y French Somallland) Territory
plus Israel and Jordan. Tables VI and VII provide a few
facts about each territory.
Two interests are dominant in the area; the primary one
being the Israel/Arab conflict )
related Suez Canal situation.
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Both of ttlcse interests have
commanded world attention, and especially sizable economic
and military outlays by the Soviet Union and the United
States.
I am not going to dwell at length about the Israeli-
Arab situation. It ranks as one of the key problem areas
of the world, primarily because of its potential for causing
an unplanned confrontation between the two superpowers, and
also due to the fanatical hatred and nearly total inflexi-
bility or. the part of the combatants. A willingness to com-
promise by the Jewish/Arab participants is simply not present.
Consequently, the many outside attempts to seek an amenable
solution have failed, seldom even achieving the slightest
concession by anyone. The projection of U.S. and Soviet
interests on opposing sides is, officially, to guarantee a
balance of power between the adversaries and theoretically
to breed stability in the region. However, both pDwers are
also determined to prevent total forfeiture of their own
influence in the area and the likely followon loss of siz-
able investments and stature. The Suez Canal hes been closed
since June 1967, as a result of the Israeli/Arab six day war.
The immediate effect of the closure was the rerol1ting of
Shipping, especially that between the Persian GUlf/South
Asia areas and the Western Europe/Mediterranean areas.
Since more than twenty thousand ships passed through T.he
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•canal during 1966, the closing of the canal has affected the
10purse strings of many nations. Long-term effects, such as
increased transportation costs, doubling and tripling of
shippir..g distar.cc:s in many instances, dev010pment of' super-
tankers, and significant reduction in the revenue of' certain
ports in the Red Sea, Gulf of Suez and Gulf of Aden are~
have occurred.
Today the key issues seem to be the short and long-term
effects which might result from opening the Canal, and specu-
lation about which state or states will benefit the most from
such an event. There is general agreement that three of the
effec S would be as follows:
fjrst step toward possible settlement of Arab/
Israeli conflict
. reduced probability of U.S./Soviet confrontation
in the Sue~ area
reduction in shipping costs for many consumers.
'l'able VIII provides an assessment of who would gain the most
from an open Canal.
There are certainly other loss/gain considerations, but
those listed in Table VIII seem to be the ones most often men-
tioned. One disturbing conclusion ~s that the
-L potential
Soviet gains appear to be substantl'al While thosp. of the
United States do not.
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Development status. All of the states and tp.rri-
tories of the reg~on except Israel are considered leSser
developed countries. Annual per capita income ranges be-
tween one hundred and six hundred dollars, no GNP is greater
than six billion dollars and only IsraelIs literacy rate ex.-
11 tceeds forty percent. As in the Western region, t~le sta es
are primarily dependent upon agricultural products (limited
in number) and light industry. While the closure of the canal
has hurt world trade, it has stimulated increased regional
trade. The majority of the states are making economic pro-
gress according to most measurement indicators. Unfortunately
the instabi,li ty of much of the area has limited regional in-
vestment.
Marine Orientation. Although the region possesses
a coastline approximatelY 3,500 miles long, v~ry little ex-
offshore along most of the
The other shelfs are seldom . ~WlQCr than ten miles.coast.
ploitation is made of the resources of the sea. Except for
F.gypt, the fishing industries are undevelopc,d, -'V although
Somali and Ethiopia are attempting to increase their capa-
bi,lity. Only Ethiopia haG a sizable continental shelf, ~x­
tending more than fifty miles
Although some offshore mineral 1cxp oration is bc;ing con-
ducted, only Bgypt is producing any offshore oil in the Gulf
of Suez. Perhaps the potentially m t 1os va uable mineral
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resources are the Red Sea deposits, located near the center
of the Red Sea, between Sudan and Saudi Arabia, in depres-
sions about 2,000 meters deep. Thr:se deposits, or lIhot
brines,T1 arc: extremely warm and salty, and analysis revp.aled
that they contain several percent zinc and copper plUS les-
12
t ' s f' 1 d s'l and gold Who might exploitser por lon 0_ ea, l,ver ~.
th8se deposits is not clear. Although the mining technology
for efficient recovery is Dot yet available, three companies
have already applied to three diffl.:rent states for leasing
13
rights.
The major ports throughout the region are listed in
lI'able VII. The recent trend is. to improve port facilities,
primarily with outside help. Somalian ports and D,libouti
are the most active in this development. The opening of the
Suez Canal would certainly increase the busineSS of the
regionTs ports.
Mutual Relations. The stat~s of the region are
splintered not only by their religious differences but also
by the fact that they have different benefactors. Beside
the Arab/Israeli conflict and Suez Canal, dilemma previously
mentioned, Ethiopia bas perhaps the most complex r bJp 0 .cms.
Its relations with Somalia and the Arab world are often un-
pleasant, as rebels in southeastern Ethiopia receive support
from Somalia, and th~ independence movement by the Eritreans
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is supported by Arab elements. Ethiopia nas a number of
options, ranging from development of closer ties with East
African states, which it has done with Kenya, to joining
the Arab world, or attempting to follow an independent path.
Resolving disputes with Somalia would perhaps be the most
t b 'l' , t 14p R l lZlng even ~
The Egyptian and Israeli forces tend to coni'ront each
other away from the Red Sea area. Ethiopia, Sudan and
Somalia all have navies and air forces, relatively small
I1nd comparable with each other. Patrol type vessels and a
few fighter/bomber aircraft are the general force composi-
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tion.
France, which still maintains a small force in its
Afars/lssas territory, Britain, and Italy all possessed
colonies in the region in the past. Their infLuence, other
than perhaps economically oriented, appears quite marginal
today. 'T'he primary interests have drawn the two superpowers
into the region, resulting in the input of new forces of
influence as well as large quantities of foreign aid.
Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf Region.
General Description. This relatively small but
tremendously important portion of the Indian Ocean a-rea has
received a tremendous amount of external power attention in
recent years. The region consists of ten nati.ons, ODe a
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union of six or seven Arab 8mirates, plus Yemen~ The Peoples
Democratic Republic of Y~men (PDR of Yemen--formerly South
Yemen)~ GroaT':" Qatar, Bahrain; Saudi Arabia, Kuwait" Iraq
and Iran. Tables IX and X offer a brief description of each
nation, includ1ng past and present affiliations.
One interest far overshadows all others in the Arabian
Sea/Persian Gulf area" and that is oil. Whatever statistics
are studied, either oil reserves, oil proquction or oil
revenue, the importance of this resource to the region is
readily confirmed. Table XI depicts the status of proven
oil r serves throughout the world. Approximately sixty p~r­
cent of the world's known oil reserves are located in the
Middle East, and the vast majority specifically in the Per-
sian Gulf area.
Production figures are equally impressive" as about
thirty percent of the world's oil is produced in the Persian
Gulf area today. Table XII indicates production figures be-
tween the years 1959 through 1971. The value of this oil to
the oil producing states is reflected in Table XIII, which
delineates the oil revenues each state has realized during
the period 1965 through 1970.
The preceding two tables demonstrate the degree of de-
pendence on oil production and the resultant revenues upon
Which many of the Persian Gulf' countrieS' rely. Any inter-
ruption of this source of income would be severely felt
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within these nations and not well received. Furthermore the
importance of Persian Gulf oil to outside states is appre-
elated When one observes that Japan and Western Europe im-
po~t approximately eighty-five percent and fifty percent of
their oij respectively from the Persian Gulf area.
Production ana transportation costs also reveal some
interesting aspects of the Persian Gulf oil situation. ~he
estimated production costs per barrel in the major oil areas
of the world are listed in Table XIV. Transportation costs
reveal that oil Shipments to Western Europe from Venezu~la
are thirty-eight cents per barrel cheaper ttan those from
the Middle East J while shipments from North Africa arc fifty-
four cents per barrel cheaper than Middle East supplies.
Prior to the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967J the corre-
sponding figures for Venezuela and North Africa oil shipments
relative to the Middle East were twenty-three cents and
. 16
thirty-seven cents per barrel cheaper respectively. Thus
from 'itTestern Europe I s point of view J since North African and
Middle East production costs are nearly eq'J.ivalent J the
lower transportation cost from North Africa certainly places
its Dil in a favorable competitive position with tile Middle
East oil. However, while North African oil may be cheaper J
it also appears to be riskier J since the policies of the
Libyan govRrnment tend to be unpredictable:;. This considera-
tion J coupled with substantial \'lestc:rn European investmAnts
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in the Middle East, most likely insure that Western Europe
will remain a large purchaser of Middle East Oil. Compared
to Veopzuelan oil, Middle Fast oil is cheaper to Western
European states, for the lower transportation cost from
Venezuela is overshadowed by the greater p:rodu.ction expense.
Japan has few alternatives other than utilizing Middle
East oil. Although Indonesia is much closer and Japan is
providing exploration assistance to that nation, production
is still only about five percent that of the Middle East.
Consequently Japan will continue purchasing large quantities
of Persian Gulf oil in the foreseeable futu!'e. Maintaining
friendly relations throughout the Indian Ocean area and tn-
suring that shipping lanes are not severed or threatened are
major objectives of Japan.
Development status. The states of the Arabian
Peninsula/Persian Gulf Region present an economic picture
of contrast. A few possess significant wealth, most Of Which
has not been used appreciably to improve the economic condi-
tion of the state or its people. The countries best resem-
bling this category are Oman, Abu Dhabi., Dubai and possibly
Kuwait. Similarly the states of Saudi Arabia, Iran and to
a lesser extent Iraq also have tremendous oil revenues, but
they have fairly extensive development plans in effect,
Which should continue to improve the economic situations in
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these countries. 17 A final group, Yeml'D, Peoples Democratic
Republic of Yemen and the five other members of thp. Unior. of
Arab Emirates, is conspicuous by its lack of wealth. Explora-
tion is underway, but none of these states has located any
oil resources. Thp. gross national product (GNP) of the
wealthier nations ranges 'between 2.8 and 8.3 billion dollars
while minimum per capita income is three hundred dollars.
Conversely Yemen and PDR of Yemen have GNPs o,f 500 and 127
mil'l:Lon dollars respectively, and average per capita incomes
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of roughly 115 dollars.
In general, mining and agriCUltural output is very low
throughout the area; Iran and Saudi ~rabia produce the most
in each category. The literacy rate is extremely low in most
states, although some improvement is gradually occurring.
Marine Orientation. The Pc-:rsian Gulf/Arabian Sea
bodies of water are two of the most plentiful sources of fiSh,
Shrimp and oysters in the Indian Ocean. Interest in fishing
varies considerably by country. The PDR of Yemen and Oman
are the area leaders in ~ishcries exploitation~ While Kuwait,
Saudi Arabia and Iran catch smaller quantities. The Persian
Gulf is a rich shrimp source~ particularly along the western
coas'c and the central castern. coast. Kuwait has 'landed the
largest catches of Shrimp, and has the most developed indus-
try, with Bahrain, Iran a~d Saudi Arabia providing srnaJler
]0
amounts. During the ten year period, 1959-1968, the total
catch of shrimp increased from '(39,000 pounds to 20,958,,000
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pounds.
Regarding potential fisheries sources, the Arabian Sea
area is considered most promising~ primarily due to its
prominence as an upwelling area. Its greatest limitation is
that much of the area experiences very rough seas, particu-
larly during the southwest monsoon season. Consequently
fairly large fishing vesselS will be required to exploit the
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region adequately.
Substantial amounts of offshore oil r.xist in the Persian
CUlf, and production and further exploration of this resource
occurs extensively throughout the area. Iran, Kuwait, Bah-
rain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi and Dubai arr. involved
i"n offshore oil production/.... xploration in varying degrees.
No other marine activities of any significance occur within
the region.
Table X lists the prominent ports belonging to each
state in the area. Since the dominant business is Oil, the
busiest ports today are tnose that service the oil tankers
in the persian Gulf. Aden has suffered a severe decline in
business, primarily the result of the closure oQ the Suez
Canal. In general., the trend is one of new and improved
facilities for most of the Persian Gulf ports.
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The width of the continental shelf varies extensively
throughout the Arabian Sea/Persian Gulf area. Saudi Arabia
has a fairly extensive 811elf, particularly in the sou -,hern
portion of the Red Sea and in the Persian Gull. Yemen also
has a shelf width averaging more than thirty nautical miles.
'The shelf off Oman exte-nds m.ore than thirty nautical miles
in places, but is generally narrow. Delimitation of the
Shelf in the Persian Gulf' is a SUbject of dlspute, particu-
larly between Iran/Saudi Arabia and Iran/Iraq, although
21
agreement was reached between the former. The poten~ial
wealth of offshore oil prOVides a basis for sensitivity in
these disputes.
Mutual Relations. The maze of entanglements and
disputes which characterize the area make it impossib~e to
delineate all these events. The most recent and more pre-
dominant relations will be described. The Arabian Peninsula
is perhaps the region of greatest unrest, as rich (oil) and
poor (no oil) couEtries interface, competition thrives as a
number of states seek to fill the void of British departure,
and various forms of interference by external states occur.
Egypt supported a costly civil war in Yemen with men and
materials throughout the middle sixties, which ended in a
standoff. The PDR of' Yemen gained its independence with
the British departure of 1967, then saw the importance and
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income of its port of Aden decline as the Suez Canal closed.
It has experienced continual political and economic problems,
is dependent upon Russian and Chinese aid, and has become a
staging area for the export of insurgency. The PDR of Yemen
supports rebels in the province of Eritrea (Ethiopia) and
western Oman (Dhofar), where the Popular Front i'or Libera.-
tion of the Occupied Arab Gulf (PF'LOAC) has the mission to
iT u22free all the people from Oman to Bahrain. - Saudi Arabia
has maintained good relations with Yemen and Oman, and this
has helpAd to limit the effectiveness of the FDR of YeffiRn1s
liberation movement support activities. Yemen has received
Soviet aid, but tends to follow a neutral path, while Oman
is dependent upon British military support. At various
times Saudi Arabia has claimed portions of the Trucial
states and opposed IraD over specific issues. Since Iran
agreed to respect the wishes of Bahrain's people, t~n~
essentially accepting Bahrain's independence, relations be-
tween Saudi Arabia/Iran have improved. With th~ British
departure, Iran views itself as the logical party to assume
a dominant role in Persian Gulf affairs. Iran is vitally
interested in maintaining unhindered Shipping transits for
exporting oil in the Persian Gulf and t}),I'ough the strait of
Hormuz. Possessing the strongest naval and air forces in
= the area, Iran prefers that external powers remain i~ the
Indian Ocean and not interfere in the Gulf. To emphasize
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its position, Iran occupied the Greater and Lesser Twnbs
and Abu Musa Islands on 30 November 19'11. The islands arc
strategically important~ for they command the Strait of
Hormuz, entrance to the Persian Gulf. Iran has worked to
solidify her position of strength by improving relatiDns
with Russia during the sixties while maintaini,ng good rela-
tiQDS with the United States.
The Iraq regime has tended tD be revolutionary and ex-
pansionistic, threatening Kuwait and Iran on various occa-
sions. Unrest between Iran and Iraq has lo~g been a his-
toric fact~ and will probably continue in the future.
Northern Indian Ocean Begion,'
General Descr1ption. The Northern Indian Oc~an
Area contains four nations and the Laccadiv , Andaman and
Nicobar island groups, each of which is owned by India. The
primary interest in this region is the relationShip between
India and Pakistan, particularly the longstanding animos~ty
between these states. Tables XV and XVI provide assorted
information about the countries of the Northern Indian Ocean
Region.
The disputes and fighting between Inrlia and Pakistan
are not new, despite the fact that each country has been
independent for only twenty-four years. The controversies
are primarily of a religious nature, with numerous conflicts
between Hindus and Moslems occurring throughout the past cen-
turicn. The creation of separate Hindu and Moslem states 1n
1947 has not solved many of the proble~s, and two armed con-
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flicts occurred in 1948/49 and 1965.
The division of Pakistan into two components did not make
administration and control an easy matter. The East was the
poorer region, consisting of only fifteen percent of th(' na-
tionTs land, but containing fifty-four percent of the popula-
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tion. East Pakistan was the agricultural base, while West
Pakistan strove for industrial development. Relations between
the two territories were often strained, with East Pakistan
complaining that it had little voice in government matters
and was often exploited by West Pakistan.
Much of the time martial law prevailed throughout paki-
stan. East Pakistan won control of the majority of seats in
the National Assembly during the December 1970 election.
When the assembly was not convened as schedulpd on 1 March
1971, extensive rioting and strikes occurr~d in East Paki-
stan. The Army was sent to subdue the uprising in the East
and prevent any attempt to establish an independent state.
The Army was successful, but used excessi:ve force and bru-
tality to accomplish its mission. As a result, durine the
eight month period of April through November 1971, nearly
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ten million refugees crossed the border between East Paki-
stan and India. India was UIlable to halt th flow of refu-
gees, the problr:ms of caring for them became overwhelming,
and relations between India and Pakistan steadily deteri-
orated. Both countries began ~ncreasing troop strengths
along the borders, and in early December a number of infil-
tration and reprisal skirmishes quickly led to war. irhe
war lasted fifteen days and ended with India controlling
East Pakistan. and offering a truce .• which was accepted and
immediatel;}! followed by Pal~istan I s unconditional surrender
of t,hE- Eastern region to Tndia. 25 Subsequent events led to
the establishment of a new nation, Bangladesh, and recogni-
tion by an increasing number of states.
Development status. All of the states comprising
the North,ern area are:: considered underdeveloped. Annual per
capita income ranges between 80 and 140 do!lars~ while only
India has a gross national product greater than 15 billion
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dollars. Although efforts have been madR to 0xpand indGs-
trialization, the:: vast majority of the people work in agri-
culture. Only India possesses sizable amounts of r.aw ma-
terials, the predominant one being iron are.
One of the significant differences between the Northern
region and the three \\lestern areas is the tremendous popu-
lation of the Northern area. Total populatio~ of the three
•Western regions is about 200 million while the Northern
region contains 710 million persons. The areas of the af'orc-
mentioned regibns are 5,600,000 square miles a~d 1,652 ,000
square miles respectively, Which correspond to popUlation
densities of' 36 and 429 persons pE?r squar~ mile. Such a
popUlation density has contributed to many of the proolems
of the area.
Marine Orientation. India, Pakistan~ and Ceylon
have growing fishing interests in the Indian Ocean. India,
in particular, had a catch of 1.7 million tons in 1970.
Ceylon and Pakistan caught lesser amounts, but increased
development of the industry is anticipated in Pakistan with
Russian assistance. However, the recent war setback coupled
with Russia I s support of Ind:La may curtail this assistance .
Since 1961-1965, during which time India participated in the
International Indian Ocean Expedition (TIDE), marine science
programs have progressed SUbstantially in India. Interest
in fiShing, occanoe;raphy and continental shelf exploitation
is increasing.
Pakistan has made its greatest progress in fiShing and
fish processing development. Offshore mineral pxploration
is also receiving attention, particularly oil exploration
in the Bay of Bengal. Other marine activities are sti.ll in
... 2'7the infant sL.age.
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India possesses a large continental shelf, particularly
of"f its west coast, where it Gxtends offshore more than 150
nautical miles in a few locations, and averages about fifty
nautical miles width. The shelf off the east coast is gen~
erally less than thirty nautical miles 8XCP.pt in the vicinity
of Calcutta, where it approaches 110 nautical miles. Paki-
stanIs shelf ranges from twenty to seventy nautical miles,
the wider portion existing off KaraC!li. rr:le continental
shelf off Bangladesh is greater than seventy nautical miles
in most locations. Ceylon has a very narrow shelf, seldom
exceeding twenty nautical miles.
Mutual Relations. Mutual relations between India
and Pakistan were addressed. India has fUlly supported the
new regime in Bangladesh, and thus far cooperation between
the two states is excellent. India can be expected to seek
cordial relations with Bangladesh, for a "worry free" border
in the cast will be one less problem With Which to cope.
Ceylon and India are continuing to work toward closer rela-
tions-, particularly in their Efforts to r8habilitate state-
28less persons. Little trade exists between the two neigh-
bors" however.
India occupies a central position in the Indian Ocean,
as its Southern peninsula protrUdes approximately seven
hundred miles into the northern Indian Ocean. The fact that
India possesses 2,759 miles of coastline, partially indi-
cates its dependence upon the sea. This dependence mani-
fests itself in the form of trade, as a huge population;
wealth of' raw materials and cent-ral position are basic in-
gredients for a thriving trade in both easterly and westerly
directions. Panikkar argues that India's extensive coagt
makes it vulnerable to domination from the sea by any state
controllinr; the Indian Ocp.an. He believes that India must
develop as a naval power in order to protect its national
interests. Such development must be long term, for achiev-
ing naval strength requires industrial strength and scien-
tifle and technological advancement, areas in which India
is making progress but is still relatively weak. Panikkar
further defines what India's naval objectives and policies
should be and prOVides a methodology for attaip-ir.g naval
power. 29 Such efforts to date have been fairly successful
as the Indian navy is the strongest of any Indian Oc~an
state. ~7hen viewed in conjunction with its army and air
forces, India's strength is even more impressive. India's
rRcent victory over Pakistan has served to enhance. the
stature of its military strength.
India's national security coneerns tend to be directed
landward, as wars with Pakistan and a confrontation with
China attest. Yet historioally India has been susceptihle
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to attack by external powers from the sea. India wants to
be able to insure the defense of its territorial waters and
prevent any slngle power from dominating the Indiar: Ocean.
Thus India views the Soviet naval presence as having a neu-
tralizing effect on any United states, British, OT future
30Chinese presence.
Pakistan has been equally occupied with Indian matters.
Pak.istan views a strong Jndian navy as direct-ed at it, not
at a potential Chinese threat. She would welcome an in-
creased Indonesian, Australian, and Iranian Ilaval presence
in the Indian Ocean as a counterbalance to India1s navy.3 l
Pakistan has also worked to obtain closer relations with
other Muslim states throughout the area. It is presently
preoccupied with settling domestic and regional issues, many
of which were severely strained by the recent war with India.
Eastern Indian Ocean Region.
General Description. Of primary interest are the
strategically important access points (the straj.ts of Malacca,
Sunda and Lombok), regional stability, and Chinese and Japa-
nese plans for the area.
Certainly from a strategic viewpoint, freedom of ship-
ping through the straits is most important. If the straits
were controlled, or perhaps blocked, the primary alternative
route would be around Australia, a Journey which would add
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many days and miles to vessels transiting between Japan and
the Northern or Western Indian Ocean Regions. Furthermore,
any limitation or hindrance of passage tllrough these straits
by a particular state wou'ld be a threat to Japanese and T",Test-
ern industries and most likely result in direct confronta-
tionB. The Strait of Malacca is the predominant passageway,
accommodating 98 percent of th8 shipping which transits be-
tween the Pac-i.fic and Indian Oceans. 32 All but the largest
supertankers, which must transit via the Lomook and Makassar
Straits, can use this passagewa~.
Periodic instabilities have characterized the region
since World War II. Specific examples are the lengthy war
in Malaysia in the fifties between Britain and Communist
infiltrators, fighting between Indonesia and the Netherlands
over New Guinea, the Indonesian uprising and violence in
1965 reSUlting from a~l attempted Communist take over, and
periodic frictions between Indonesia and Malaysia. Cer-
tainJ.y spillover effects from the war in Vietnam have not
aiaed efforts to achieve regional stability.
The last factor is the future role of Japan and China
in this area. Japan has achieved tremendous economic e;r-owth
since World War II, is currently the third most powerful
Economic nation in the world, is vi tal.ly depc:ndent upon many
resources from the Eastc:rn region of the Indian Ocean and
envisions this Brr:a as an c:xpanding market for its manufactured
goods. China is more of a mystery, and its exact role or
intended irwolvement in the affairs of this, region are not
perfectly clear. However, China does envision herself' as a
world power, possesses an ever increasing nuclear capability,
has exported and supported insurgency efforts when decmed
potentiaJly beneficial and considers the region most impor-
tant as it rc;lates to China's ~ational security. Specula-
tion about specific intentions will not be attempted, but
the future moves of China and Japan will definitely influ-
ence events throughout the P.astern Indian Ocean.
Development Status. The Eastern Indian Ocean
region is most impressive in terms of size and distance,
the areas of the countries exceeding 4.2 million square
miles, and the distance from Ran~oon, Burma, to Perth,
Australia, nearly 3,400 nautical miles. All the countries
arc considered underdeveloped, with the exception of Aus-
tralia. Yet the region possesses a wealth of raw materials,
ra%lging from rubbe~ in Malaysia, to oil in Indonesia and
iron ore in Australia. Singapore is a major shipping ter-
reinal~ offering services and facilities to the hundreds of
vess~ls Which pass through the Strait of Malacca. Tables
XVII and XVIII offer a composite picture of the present
status of th~ nations comprising the Eastern region.
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Marine Orientation. lii th a few ('xceptions., the
words !1 promising developments 11 best describe marin(-2 activi-
tics of the Eastern region states. All the nations are in-
volved in fishing., most in offshore mining and a few are
promoting marine science research efforts.
Fishing is the dominant marine activity, with Thailand
and Burma producing the largest catches. Thailand caught
1.6 million tons in 1970, but only about twenty percent of
its catch oc(;urred in the Indisn Ocean. The same trend is
true for Indonesia, Whose 1966 catch totaled 750,000 tons,
but only 144,000 tons was netted in the Indian Ocean. 33
Australia 1 s fiShing industry has concentrated on the more
valuable fisheries, particularly crayfish; and its 1966 out-
put, valued at 46.4 million dollars, is expected to reach
_ 34
eighty million aollars in 1975. Malaysia's fishing indus-
try is receiving development assistance from Japan and Thai-
land.
Few offshore minerals have been discovered or exploited
off the western coasts of the Eastern area nations. Most
favorable potential may belong to Thailand., whose offshore
tin mining operations are growing, with increasing attention
directed toward the western coast of it& peninSUla territory.35
Indonesia, Australia, and Malaysia are increasing their min-
eral exploration efforts, but very few potential deposits have;
been located off their western coasts.
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Singapore is the fifth largest port in the world, as
measured by tonnage handled, and possesses an excellerrt ship-
building and repair industry. The facilities supporting
shipping activities are being modernized and expanded, to
maintain pace with increasing business.
Burma, Thailand aqd Malaysia have extensive continental
shelfs~ averaging more than fifty nautical miles in width,
and often exceeding one hundred nautical miles off Burma.
Indonesia's western and southern shelfs are generally nar-
row; often less than twenty nautical miles wide. Australia's
western shell' is not wide, perhaps averaging thirty nautical
miles; but its northwestern shelf' is very impressive, quicl<:.ly
increasing from about thirty to one hundrcd. nautical miles
as it proceeds northeast.
Indonesia claims an archipelago theory by which all
waters enclosed by straight baselines joining the outer prom-
entories of the outer islands are considered internal waters.
Its claim of a twelve mile territorial sea is then mea-
sured outward from those baselines. 36 The Indonesian govern-
ment has stated that innocent passage through its territorial
wate.rs will be permitted, but that prior permission will be
reqUired to obtain passage through inland waters.
The result is that Indonesia claims the rie;ht to control
all shipping movements through this vast expanse of water,
including the associated straits. Although this doctri e is
i+4
still proclaimed, the vol~me of commercial shipping does not
make enforcement practicable, and the pxisting government
attitude has not threatened free passage. However, foreign
warships must provide advan~c notice and receive Indonesian
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~pproval to transit internal waters.
Mutual Relations. Historically, most of the states
of Hle region have been Pacific oriented, with the Indian
Ocean attracting relatively little and infrequent attention.
Perhaps a time evolved acceptance of British reign in the
I~dian Ocean coupled with no threat from the west fostered
a lack of' concern and interest in that area. The decision
by Britain to terminate most of its defense commitmr:nts .ast
of Suez by the cnd of 1971 served as a catalyst to create a
political pact between Britain, Australia, New Zealand,
Malaysia and Singapore, which is intended to act as a sta-
bilizing influence in the region. The stated purpose of the
pact is that the governments of the participating states will
consult on What action to take ~n the event of an external
attack. r,ombinations of British, Australian, and New Zea-
land naval, air and troop forces based in Singapore and
Malaysian territory, joint training operations and uhe forma-
tion of a Joint Consultation Council to meet regularly are
planned. Although the vagueness of the organization's pur-
pose makes its potential effectiveness suspect, the actual
substance of the pact is a step towards increased regional
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cooperatlon.
Of the remaining nations in the Eaqtern Indian OCt?an
region, only Indonesia appears to have the interest or capa-
billl,. to be a factor for consi,Ieration. Thailand is almost
totally dedicated to a Pacific posture, both economically
and politically. Burma has never revealed a serious inter-
est in seapower, and its use of the Indian Ocean has pri-
marfly been fishing. Conversc:::ly, Indonesia has one of thE:-
few sizable navies of the states bordering the Indian Ocean.
It is primarily composed of Soviet warships received, in the
c;arly sixties. 'I'h8 termination of relations with Communist
countries in 1965 caused severe parts ano upkeep problems,
resulting in a limited operational capability today.39
Indonesia possesses a wealth of resources, comprising a
'vJhole spe ct rum of mine ral and agricultural good s . AI though
primarily oriented to the north~ Indonesia's wealth and geo-
graphical position, which encompasses the whole central por-
tion o_f' the Eastern area, identifj.es it as a key parti<..:i-
pant in Eastern Indian Ocean mattera.
Besides possessing a vast amount of mineral wealth,
Australia is the most industrially developed country in the
region. Its main dilemma today is to decide the form of its
future role in this area: either a llfortress Australia ll or
Ilforward defense'" posture, with the latter soemingly emerging
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as the c rrent favorite. However, the magnitude and format
of Australia's involvement in the regional affairs remains
to be determined.
A neutral Indian Ocean excluded of foreign naval powers
is the desire of most of the states of the Eastern region.
However, they also view this desire as idealistic, and recog-
nize the fact that all external powers have established
Indian Ocean interests and arc likely to maintain a presence
to support these interests. Thus a balance of power is seen





EXTERNAL POWER INTERESTS IN Tfill INDIAN OCEAN
Who are the external powers in the Indian Ocean? I am
considering the Sovi@t Union, United States, Japan, China
and a group or western European nations, called the "W'est0rn
European Dloc, as the five external powers that possess
visible interests in the Indian Ocean. A nation can express
its inte~rests in many ways. Two broad categories can be
labeled "word II interests and "ac tion T1 interests. "Word II
interests are those interests whicn are voiced by a nation
as eXisting, but are not clearly substantiated by evidence.
Conversely lIac tion ll interests are thosp. which arc clearly
reveal&d through some measure of investment, such as economic
or military aid, economic, military or political support, or
establishment of a military pres@nce. The specific !1ac tion"
interests displayed by Qach state/blOC will be delineated and
the apparent trends that thesp. inter.ests foretell will be
identified.
Western Europe Interests in the Indian Ocean.
General. Historically, Western European interest
and exploitation, especially by Britain., France., Portugal,
and to a lesser extent the Netherlands, Germany and Italy~
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dominated tbe Indian Ocean area until World War II. Even
after l};T orld vJar II, when a spirit of' nationalism engulfed
the entire region, British influ2nce remained as the domi-
nant external presence. Today, as the British withdrawals
from Singapore and the Persian Gulf near completion, Britain,
France, and Portugal still rotain possessions and invest-
ments in the Indian Ocean which must be consider~d. The
emphasis has shifted, however, from one predominantly of'
control and exploitation, to one of partial dependence, pro-
tection of investments and normal relations.
Specific. Clearly, insuring a continued sufficient
and unhindered supply of oil from the Middle F~ast is the
greatest immediate and long-term concern of Western Europe.
The yearly rate of increase in the demand for oil i1': Western
1
Europe exceeded ten percent in 1970. It is estimated that
petrole~m!s share of WesteTn Europe's energy requirements
will increase from forty percent in 1970 to sixty percent i:o-
21980. Despite new oil discoveries throughout the world,
estimates still place the Middle East oil reserves at sixty
,
to sixty-rive percent or the world's total oil reserves.
During recent years, Western Rurope has obtained about fifty
percent of her- oil requirements from the Middle Ea.st. Al-
though it has purchased nearly an equivalent amount at a
lower cost fron North Africa, additional dependence upon
this source is considered very risky, particularly When deal-
ing with the unpr~dictable Libyan regime. Consequently
Western Europe must retain access to her rc~atively stable
su ply of Middle East oil.
The Western European Bloc is concerned with the Soviet
inte~tions in the Indian Ocean. Much attention is de-voted
to the following question: does the increased Soviet pres-
ence reflect a relatively new naval power expanding her 8CO-
nomic ana political interasts in the Indian Ocean or is a
force being developed to threaten Western European interests
in the future?
Western European inter~st in th~ Indian Ocean also
manifests itself in the form of investments. Britain, in
part~cular, durin~ her reign of approximately 140 years in
th€~ area made numerous long-term invcstmp.nts. At the begin-
ning of 1971 Britain's investments in Malaysia, Singapore
and the Persian Gulf region were estimated at seven billion
dollars, with yearly imports ar.d exports approximate y three
4billion dollars each. 'fwenty percent of aLl the shipping
at sea each day is owned by Britain, and an average o~ twelve
~rit:Lsh si'lips transit the Strait of Malacca each day. Re-
Siding in many of the littoral states are British citizens,
many of Which ntill serve in administrative functions. 5 A
number of possessions are retained by the Urlited Kingdom in
_ the Indian Ocean, and consist of the follOWing: British
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Indian Ocean Territory~ comprised of the Chagos Archipelago J
Aldabra J Farquhar and Desroches Islands; and the Seychelles
Islands. Although their mtlitary involvement in the area
decIined greatly from 1967 through 19'7lJBritain owns or
utilizes the followin8 de~ense ~acilities: air bases--
Masi ah J in the Arabian Sea southeast of Oman (99 year lease
from Oman in 1958); Salalah (western Oman)J seldom used;
Gan Island" southern extremity of the Maldive Islands (30
year lease from the Maldives in 1965); Butterwo~th (north-
western Malaysia); naval facilities, access--Simonstown
naval base and Durban, South Africa; Mombasa J Kenya;
~auritius (naval communications station pJus airport usage
through 1974); Malagasy (use of Majli..Y1ga airfield to conduct
surveillance patrols off Mozambique, relating to economic
6
sanctions against Rhodesia); and Fremantle, Australia.
Dri tain is committed to a more direct presenc'e in thE';
Eastern Indian Ocean region through its involvement in ANZUK.
Specifically the British will provide two frigates, patrol
airc raft and one troop battalion as its share oj' the five
nation pact. Britain has agreed to keep at least six
frigates east of Suez on a continuous basis, and retains
access to former bases at Bahrain and Singapore. 7 The
British commitment theory at present is that a modest mili-
tary presence on a continuous basis serves to maintain ,sta-
bility and enhance British prestige, aid commercial venturcs J
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•provide comfort to friends in the area, and permit quick
response if necessary. However, opponents of the theory
argue that it increases the risk of a progressive entangle-
S
Mento
l"i'rench investments, thoug,h fewer than Britain's, also
exist in the Indian Ocean. !rance retains the following
possessions: Afars and Issas (formerly French Somaliland);
Comoro Islands; La Reunion; and the nearly uninhabited Ker-
guelen, Crozet and Amsterdam Islands. 1"rench naval f'3.cili-
ties exist at Djibouti (Afars and rssas), La Reunion, and
Diego Suarez (MaLagasy Republic). Commitments include co-
operation with the Malagasy Republic in defense, economic,
monetary and financial matters. France also has pQrmissiorl
'lo usc other port facilities in Madagascar J and retains
approximately 2,500 military personnel plus a small mixture
of ships and aircraft in that country. The French appear
determined to maintain an interest and presence in the area,
in order to protect their investments and commitments if
9
necessary.
Western European colonial empires and the control and
exploitation they represented have disappeared in the Indian
Ocean. still their interests remain, gen.erally in an economic
and diplomatic vein; but specifically reflected in their
dependence on Persian Gulf oil, protec'tion of investments,
and concern over Soviet intentions.
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•China's Interests.
General. Except for an interrnittent naval prps-
ence in the Indian Ocean between the twelfth and sixteenth
centuries, China has historically shown very little inter-
est in the Indian Ocean. Only since the Communist take
over in 1949 has Chinals influence penetrated the region,
and its investments are relatively small When compared to
the efforts of the other external powers. Yet China must
be:: considered a formidable external power, if only 0n a
potential basis, because of its great size, its competition
in many fields With the Soviet Union, and the problems
created by instability, Which often accompanies Chinese
assistance .
S2ecific. According to 1968 statistics, less than
eight percent of Chinars forei/Sn trade has been with Indiar:
Ocean states. It has followed a policy of selective foreign
aid and trade in this area. More than fifty Re~cent of
Chinese aid has gone to Tanzania and Zambia, where it is
10helping build a railroad from Dar es Salaam into Zambia.
The investment has totaled more than foul' hundred million
dollars, since its beginning in 1970. Estimated completion
is in 19'75, and the railroad will be primarily used to haul
11
Zambia's copper tD the port of Dar es Salaam. China has
also provided military assitance in the form of training ana
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equipment to Tanzania's armed forces. Besides providing
tanks and patrol boats, it is reported to be planning to
12
g.ive two squadrons of MIG-l'? aircraft to Tanzania. Con-
struction of facilities on Zanzibar Island for monitoring
missile tests may be in progress.
China has directed its South Asia support to Pakistan,
especially since its military confrontation with India in
the early sixties. SineR 1966 D the Chines~ hav~ provided
tanks, fighter aircraft and, more r~cently: two or threp.
whiskey class submarines to the Pakistanni armed forces.
lj
Althougb China has not revealed any inter0.st in Middle
East oil, it has increased its trade relations with Kuwait,
.Iraq and the Peoples DemDcratic Hepublic of Yemen (PDR of
Yemen). China is suspected of being a principal contributor
to the liberation movement efforts of PFL0AG, originating in
14PDR of YemEn but operating in Oman. Similar assistance is
or may be provided to the rebels operating in Eritrea in
support of their grievance against Ethiopia. Targets of
opportunity such as these can be exploited at minimurE cost
When the potential gain is considered greater than the risk
involved.
China has supported the government 01' Ceylon, but sup-
posedly was rejected in its attempt to obtain base rights at
Trincomalee. Rxcept for its use of the facilities at Dar es
Salaam, t.here are no indications that the Chinese have at-
tempted to obtain bas~s in th~ Indian Ocean.
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China's navy is defense oriented, consisting primarily
of patrol and landing craft, torpedo boats, gunboats and
minesweepers. It also has about twelve destroyer and de-
15
st'royer escorts and thirty-three submarines. Rarely have
elements of China's navy steamed in the Indian Ocean. Al-
though China's In~rchant fleet is growing, its total tonnage
16is less tban fiv~ percent of Japan's fleet.
Demilitarization of' the Indian Ocean to reduce the
threat of Soviet encirclement is one of' China's interests.
A paraliel concern is the potential threat posed by United
States and Russian ballistic missile SUbmarines in the
17
Indian Ocean.
China can be expected to invest either politically,
economically or rnilitari,ly in those situations which appear
most attractive. It will continue to export its influence
in an attempt to diffuse Soviet, United states and Japanese
influence. 'llhough unable and probably unwilling to compete
in the In~ian Ocean at a level of magnitude equivalent to
Russian or .Japanese investments, China wi~l projr=ct its




General. Since the end of \-lorld War TI, Japan has
experienced a phenomenal economic recovery. Its annual
growth rate has averaged about thirteen percent, and today
it has the third· largf:st gross national product (GNP) in the
world. Japan's 19~(0 GNP was nearly 201 bill:' on dollars and
the 1975 GNP estimate is 418 billion dollars. Japan pos-
sesses roughly three percent of the world's popUlation, but
utilizes 6.2 percent of its imports. 1B I~ 1969, its volume
of imports and exports exceeded four h1..mdred million tons,
and is, expected to double by 1985. During 1969., twenty-two
percent of Japan I s imports origLY1ated in the Indian Ocean
area, while twenty-three percent arrived from Europe. ("to>..,lnce
the greatest percentage of imports from .Europe transit the
Indian Ocean, approximately forty percent of Japan's imports
travel across that body of water. 19 The preceding statistics
Vividly demonstrate Japan'S emergence as a wotld power, and
identify the nature of its interests in the Indian Ocean
area.
Specific. Japan1s major interest in the Indian
Ocean area is trade, primarily as a source of raw materials
for its voracious industries and increasingly as a growing
market for its finished products. Oil is its rrlost precious
import which transits the Indian Ocean, for about cighty-
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eight percent of ja.pan I s imported, oil is pur-chased from the
Persian Gulf area. Significant amounts of iron or~~ copper,
bauxite, nickel, natural gas, cotton, wool and suga,r are
also purchased from Indian Ocean states. Some critics feel
that Japan is exploiting the region by consuming vast quan-
tities of raw materials, selling finished goods back to the
ar'ea I S markets, but not proviaing the approprj ate assistance
and development loans to enable local industrial growt~l.
Japan is not only dependent upon resource acquisition
in the region, but it is vitally concerned with unhampered
shipping and navigation, both in the ocean and through its
access points. The Japanese are sensitive to any potential
power shifts in th~ Indian Ocean region Which might disrupt
its oil supply. Japan 'tlould prefer a broad balance of power
throughout the region, rather than dominance by a singlc;
t . 20na/lon.
Although Japan1s navy includes nearly forty frigates
and destroyers and eleven submarines, its mission is pri-
marily territorial def'ense. It,s navy cannot be expected to
adequately protect Japan's more distant shipping lanes in a
crisis. During the summer of 1969, a few ships of tllc Japa-
nese Self DefensG Force made a goodwill visit to Indian and
Australian ports, the first time since 1tJorld \\Tar II that
d t . 21Japanese warships entere "he Indlan Ocean.
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Japan has made sizable business investments in many of
the littoral states of the Indian Ocean. Specifically thou-
sands of salesmen, buyers;! tecDJlicians and engineers are in
Africa, where many joint inves'tment ventures have been ini-
tiated with African states. The tendency is toward mutual
inv0stments, which share the funding and risks, as well as
the profits. 'The reason for this approach is expressed
nieely as follows:
Development of Africa's natural resources and
launching new manufacturing efforts in tbe
reeion requires often fantastic investments
~nd assumption of unusual risks involving un-
stable governments. 22
Japanese companies have invested in Middle East oil.
Eighty percent of the Arabian Oil Company Limited, located
in the Neutral Zone between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, is owned
by aapanese Petroleum Trading Company. One hundred percent
of the Abu Dhabi Oil Company is owned by three Japanese com-
panies, and the Mitsubishi Oil Developing Company is opEra-
23ting in Abu Dhabi.
Automobile manufacturers and mining companies arp in-
creasing their activities in Africa. Japan is a likely
investor in a planned trans-African highway, which is viewed
as a contributor towards an increasing market for Japanese
24
cars and trucks. Improved road faci~ities will permit more
efficie~t transportation of raw materials from the African
i~terior to the ocean ports.
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Japanese fishermen are active participants in the In-
dian Ocean, competing with the Soviet Union as the two
principal external states fishing in that ocean. Japan
built a fish processing plant in Mauritius, and fishermen
operate extensively in that area. It is also assisting a
number of the local states with the development of their
fishing industry.
Japan's investment endeavors in Africa ~ave not en-
countered much resistance. ,Tapan is viewed with less sus-
picion in Afrir-:a, whic:rl it never invaded or color..ized, than
in Southeast Asia. 'rhe foreign ministry of Japan is very
sensitive to criticism by Black African nations about its
volume of trade With South Africa, which totalled 350 mil-
lion dollars in 1969. In each r.gion, hut for diff~rent
reasons, Japan's approach must be reasonably cautious. The
Japanese presence is accepted today, but as Prime Minister
Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore stated, liThe chapter is closed but
25
not forgotten.!!
rrraup., as shaped by resource acquisition, particularly
Oil, and markets for products, are the key Japanpse inter-
ests in the Indian Ocean. A requirement for safe and secure
shipping lanes automatically follows, as does concern over
any potential imbalance of power Which has the capability to
threaten free Shipping. Japan has much to offer the develop-
- ing nations of the Indian Ocean, and can be expected to in-
crease its presence throughout most of that area.
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Soviet Union Interests.
General. OT all the big powers, the Soviet Union,
through its actions, has probabJy generated the most atten-
tion J concern and speculation about its llltimate intentions
in tl1R Indi.an Ocean. Theories have varied, from one extreme
that the U.S.S.R. is merely a major power with a large and
modern navy projecting this navy throughout the oceans of
the worJ.d, to the other extreme ",rhich hypothesizRs the
V.S.S.R.ts interest in eventual conquest and control of the
Persian Gulf oil supplies. A brief review of certain Soviet
capabilities, identified by recent trends and event~ JS pre-
sented as a starting point before discussing specific Russian
intcrestf3.
The Soviet Navy has experie.nced tremendous growth during
the past ten years. Two features of the Russian navy are most
im.pressive. The first is the improvement in quality and capa-
bili.ty of the Soviet submarine force, which has remalned.
neaT] y constant in quantity, 350 to l.j 00 boats. 'I'oday the
Russians have approximately ninety nuclear SUbmarines, in-
cluding forty ballistic missile boats of the rrYankeel'l class
either operational or undCT construction. The U.S.S.R. also
has approximately sixty-rour cruise missile submarines which
26
pose a formidable threat to surface ships. This sur.face·-
to-surface cruise missile capability possessed by Soviet
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surface and subsurface ships, is the other very significant
feature of Russian naval quality. The Soviet navy is a modern,
pmverful force capable of numerous al ternativc uses.
Equal1.y impres2ive has been the growth of the Soviet
merchant fleet, whIch has grown from 1.9 million tons in
1950 to fourteen million tons in 1970, and is programmed to
27
reach twenty million tons by 1980. Similar rates of growth
have characterized the Russian oceanographic and fishing
f'leets, v.rhich included two hundred and four thousand ships
28
respectively in J.970. Expanded use of these maritime
capabil:Lties requires a variety of support facilJties through-
out the world.
In January 1968, Britain announced the plann~d with-
drawal of its military forces east of Suez by the end of
1971. Shortly after the British statement, Soviet naval
vessels commenced. operating j.n the Indian Ocean. Since
March 1968, the Russian navy has maintained nearJy a con-
tinuous presence, primarily in the western, northwestern and
northern areas of" the Ind ian Ocean. 'rhe force is usually
mixed, ranging from five to ty,rsnty naval ships, and averag-
ing about ten vessels. A typical mix consists of one mis-
sUe cruiser, two destroyers, a submarine and a few support
and research ships. The K8Y point is that apparently the
Soviet Union determined that the British withdrawal aii'or'ded
Russia a timely opportunity to :Lnsert :its navaJ presence
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into the Indian Ocean. The extc:r.t of the Soviet naval pres~
ence is smrwlarized in the 1971-72 edition of Jane's Fighting
Ships as follows: !1 five years ae;o the USSR had no
warships in the Indian Ocean, but today there arc a score
o.f surfa.ce eh:1ps alone, and there is no telling how many
Soviet submarines are in the area. ,,?9
Specif;i-c. Mucb has been INTitten about the Russian
interest in Middle East oi-l. At present the Soviet Union
uses domestic supplies to satisfy its oil requirements. Ivlo6t
experts agree that Soviet reserves, estimated at 5,500 miJ1ion
tons in 1968, are sufficient to satisfy all Russian needs
tr.!Tough 1980. After 1980, the Soviet need for I'1iddle East oil
. J 1 1'1,' 30Wl_ l~ely lncrease.
The Hussians also supply most of Eastern RuI'opc'S oil
an arrangement which is most satisfactory to the Soviet Union
as aJl available means of applying pressure when necessary.
Russia se11.s o:i.l to ltJestern Europe, which provid8s a nice
flow of money into tho Soviet treasury. Tho Scviet Union
has a number of options at this time. It can :rely solely on
domestic oil reserves, continu" ng to s@ll appropriate amounts
to Western and Eastern Europe; or increase its purchases of
MLddlc East oil, which would be cheaper to use in western
31Russia and to sell to Eastern Enrope. By using only Soviet
oi~, Russia minimizes supply and political problems; however,
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proper use and exploitat1on of the cheaper albeit r~skier
iUddle East oil, might prove more profitable in the lone; run.
RUGsia a'lready purcbaseR natural gas from Iran. An
arrangement was established in 1966, whereby qussia agreed
to build a steel mill and pipeline in Iran in return for
natural gas from Iran. That year marked the beginning of
improved relations between Iran and the Soviet Union, which
has been evidenced by increased trade between the two na-,
tions and Soviet arms sales to Iran. Perhaps this is another
example of Soviet opportunism, i'or in 1965 the Dnited States
declared Tran a developed country, and announced the termina-
't 'J..' Or.l r . d" 1'" t "d 32o~_ economJ .c an rnl.J.. ary al ,
Russia has also been a steady supporter of Iraq. Rela-
tions between Iraq and Iran have often been strained, and any
sertous disagreement between the two countries could make a
Soviet decision very difficult. Russia would certainly like
to have some control ovor the distribution of ?v'Ijddle East oil.
Such control would enable the Hussians to exercise can ider-
,1,ble powe over Western Europe and Japan, both of' wh:i ch are
presently highly dependent upon an uninterrupted flow of Mid-
East oil. 33 Any attempt to attain control over Arabian
PeninSUla/Persian Gulf oil would likely 'precipitate a direct
confrontation with the United States~ as well as arouse con-
siderable resentment 1trlthin the countries involved. Such a
venture is far too risky, especially '{"hen compared to a "wai t
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and see II policy w(lich takes advantage of opportunities wher:
31~
they occur.
Russia has devoted most of' its Indian Ocean efforts to
thG ~orthwest Region of the Indian Ocean. Soviet naval
forces have generally operated in the following areas: off
the west coast of India, Arabian Sea, Persiarl GUlf, Rpd Sea,
off the East African coast, and in the vicinity of Mauritius
and the Seychelles Island complexes. During the period
March 1968, whet: the first Soviet warsr.ips pnterecl the
Indian Ocean, to April 1971, Russian naval units visited
twenty different ports in I~QUrteen d:i.fff"rent nations, Q
total of more than fifty port visits. 35 Although the num-
ber of warships present at anyone time varies, the Soviets
have maintained an average of ten to twelve ships in the
Indlar Ocean during the last three years. Occasionally the
number has been as great as twenty.
Reasons mentioned for the SovIet naval presence vary
extensively, and all may be true to some degree. Certainly
the impact of events as they occur in the Indian Ocean, af-
fects interested nations in a variety of ways, and results
in a whole range of responses from external states.
The primary task or the Soviet navy is the protection
of the national security of the Soviet Union. Consequently
Russia will be interested in dr:ploying its navy into any area
rwhere a threat is perceived. ',Jhether or not a fact, if the
U.S.S.R. believes that United States ballistic missile sub-
marines are stationed in the Indian Ocean and are a threat
to ~ussia's security, increased naval activity Dl the area,
whi e perhaps inadequate to counter the threa.t today, could
be the initial thrust for a greater E,ffort in the future.
The facts of the matter are that the United states presently
operates two communications statj.ons in the Indian Ocean area"
which are primarily designed to service nuclear sUbmarines,
and is building a third station on Diego Garcia; and much of
Soviet and Chinese territory is within range of polaris and
36poseidon missiles launched from the Indian Ocean. A large
number of' uses for the Soviet navy can be envisioned in the
Indian Ocean. Some of the more frequently mentioned ones are:
· Counter United States ballistic missile submarine
threat
Operate and deploy new and modern naval forces i,n
warm weather environment
• Assist in gathering more information and knowledge
about the Indian Ocean (oceanographic, hydrographic
efforts)
• Show the flag among the newer developing nations of
Africa and Asia
Protect economic and military aid activities through-
out the area
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Achieve greater influence in the Persian Gulf' oil
activities
. Support space program activities
Protect Soviet fishing fleets
Contain China's influence
. Replace Britain as dominant :naval power in area.
This Ii st of inte rcstJ3 varic s in degree of' iUlportance., One
can ar~ue that the Soviets decided that British withdrawal
coupled 'Idth the likelihood of decreasing United states pres-
ence in 'SEA plus the newly realized Soviet ability V) pro ec.t
naval strength at a distance provided an opportunity to ex-
ploit Russian military and diplo::natic ci'forts throughout the
region.
The Soviets hav8 sho",rn an interest in the fishj:ng poten-
tial of the Indian Ocean, both through their a:i d prograr.w and
increased fishing fleet activities in those waters. They
provided assistance to Pakistan through developr:ic:nt of' some
fishing facilities, specifically at G\!Iradar, i/Jest Paki stan" and
also along the Egyptian coast in the Gulf of Suez. The Rus-
sians concluded an agreement with Mauritius in ,July 1970,
which authorized port usage for Soviet fishinG trawlers and
commercial aircraft landing rights to enable crew switches
on ooard the fishinG boats. Mauritius is receiving assis-
tance in developing its local fishing industry. AJthough a
sizable amount o,f significancG has b88n attach8d to this
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a~reemen1: concerning its further implications r garding base
rightS' to Soviet warsbips, the terms apparently limit the
Soviets to only fifteen trawler visits per year and no usage
"7
of base facilities by SOViet warships.~L Other reports in-
dicate that the Russians buy oil and supplies in Port Louis,
Mauritius, for their naval forces. Similar conflicting 1'.-
port's occur i!1 many of the articles discussing Soviet Indian
Occ:an rights.
The Soviets have also installed mooring buoys to S-ErV0:'
as anchorages in thE.' following Indian Ocean locations: off
Mauritius, off the Seych lles~ souttrncst of Malagasy, near
the St. Brandon Island group~ Cargado Island, off Diego
Garcia and in the Mozambique channel. Such anchorages read-
ily serve fS floating bases, functioning as rendezvous points
f 1 " 'd . t· 38)1f . ,or rep enlshment an' repalr opera lons. "oorlng auoys
er.able the Soviet fleet and other vessels to operate in a
deployed mode for exLensive periods of time ar.d not require
pcrrna:lent regional base support.
Since the Arab-Israeli conflict in June 196'1' ~ the Hus-
sians have provided the greatest proportion of the economic
and military aid received by the lmitRd Arab Republic, ar.d
have also increased their aid efforts in Sudan, Somalia,
Ycmer., PDR OI~ Yf:men, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and India.
The Soviet military aid to Somalia has been fairly ex-
tensive~ most of it supporting the army with training and
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equipment, the air force with 01IG-15s and 178, about t'welve,
and roughly 32j advisors. Additional aid has been given
towards the expansion and modernization of' the two Somali
ports of B~rbera and Mogadishu. Sp'ecificall~ the Soviets
are building two Lr, 000 foot piers and a ra.d.io station at
Berbcra. 'The Somali armed. forCes appear to be as d.C3pendent
upon Soviet advic and equiprr.ent as the arme(l forces of
Ethiopia are upon United. States aid. 39
Soviet relations Ti/i th Ethiopia improved durir..g 1970,
as Emperor HallIe Selas8ie visited. Russia and Soviet warshiDs
were invited to Massawa, Ethiopia, for a ~ort visit. Russia
has provid.ed Ethiopia with economic assistance.
The Russians have invested various amounts in Yemen and
the :Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen d.uring the last five
years. Improved facilities were constructed by Soviet enr.;i-
fleers at the port of Hodeida, Yemen, and a significant amount
of aid was provided in the past. During recent years, how-
ever, Soviet influence has decreased 'Io'rhilp- 'westeTn influence
has increased, perhaps a result of closer relations between
Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Soviet inf1ucnce has encou.nt_red
s~'ilar problems in the PDR of Yemen, as Chinese efforts have
tended to diffuse Soviet influence. The Russians can use the
ports of Hod.eida and Aden to .service their ships, but Dei ther
)10
country is a Soviet dependent.
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Another subject of' ambiguous reporting is Socotra 15-
land, Which guardB the entrance to the Gulf of Aden and. is
owned by the ?DR of Yemen. The Hussians supposedly receiv8d
permission to build an air base and communications station
on the j_sland in 1970. Allegedly ttJey u.sed it as a troop
landlllg area during recent exercises, moor ships at the two
available anchorages, and have not used the ~sland. The
Soviets have probably used Socotra' s anchorage areas., but
the other contentions have not been veri- ied.
The Russians prov:Lded increased aid to Pakistan in the
sixties and earJy scv8nties. Kost of the aid was oriented
toward heavy industry and oil exploration. Specifically,
credi t for a one millio~'1 ton steel mill in Karachi was pro-
vidp.d, a modern road connecting West Pakistan with Russia
(via Afghanistan) was completed in ,July 1970, and some miIi-
tary aid. was included. The Soviets probably hope to counter
part of ChiBaTs influence with the Pakistan gover~mcnt, and
obtain the use of port facilities for fleet support. 41
'Whether or not the Soviets have base rights in I!ldia
seems to be an ever popular topic. India has consistently
stated that Vishakhapatnarr" the base of interest on the Bay
of Berlgal, is net a Soviet base. 'J'he Soviets do use var:i.ous
Indj_an haGcs for replenishment of' stores and provisions, and
crew rest and relaxation, aG do ships of othRr nations.
Natlonalism is a powerful force in India, and probably would
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cause the removal of any ~oveTnment that permitted the es-
LI-2tablishment of foreign bases on Indian territory.
Russia gave India :four conv~ntional attacl<: submarjner::\,
foxtrot designation, five destroyer ascorts~ six missile
patrol boats and a number of landing craft and aludliaries.
The Soviets also provide a sizable amou:c.t of econom:i c aid to
ndia. Perhaps the fact that Russia and India concluded a
Twenty Year F iendship and Co-operation ~reaty in August 1971,
best illustrates Soviet/India relations. A recp.~t article
stated:
RussiaTs presence in the Indian Oeoan is ex-
pected to grow steadily with Indian help. Some
experts are convinced that th8 Indo-Soviet mutual
assistance treaty includes secret clauses pro-
viding for Sovie t naval base s in India., although
there is no physica] evidence of this as yet.
Russian naval ships visiting India nOTInally 43
anchor offshore, instead of tying up at docks.
Thus Soviet interests in the Indian Ocean are a mixture
of various :forms of mill tary and Gconorr,ic aid to many of the
littoral states, a sizable naval presence and associated port
visits, support for Egypt in hRr confrontation with Israel,
numerous fishing v8sseJs and increased investment in Middle
East oil. A variety of Soviet objectives likely exists in
the ::=ndian Ocean, but perhaps a partial answer is provj.. cled. by
the statement of' lv1r. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister,
aD 27 ,Tune 1968, which read s:
EquaJ. rights p,t all sectors and in all spheres
of activity in the international area, including
the adoption of measures tc protect the vital
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interests of the Soviet Union, its allies and
friends; no discriminstion in world trade;
extensive exchange of scientific, technological
and cultural values; freedom of navigation for
our ships and fleets, no less than for the
ships and fleets of any other power--all this
determines our pOSSibiaities and responsibili-
ties in world affairs. ~
United States Interests.
General. united States interests in the Indian
Ocean have generally been secondary interests, especially
when compared with U.S. interests in the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans. Before the mid-196os, rarely was the Indian OCRan
discussed in American periodicals or bqoks. Primary reasons
for the negligible U.S. interests are:
· Geographical separation betw0en the United States
and the Indian Ocean
No American colonization efforts in the Indian
Ocean area
· Implicit acceptance of British domination throughout
the area prior to World War II
l~ited States military operations during World War
II were almost completely in the Pacific and Atlantic
Oceans, and nearly nonexistent in the Indian Ocean
· Subsequent conflicts _' tensions and crisis involving
the United States have primarily occurTed outside the
Indian Ocean
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• American trade is mainly with European countrieS
and Southeast Asia, namely Japan
• No Indian Ocean state or force therein has posed
a serious threat to the s.curity of the Uni.t _d states.
Since 196G numerous articles have been written about
the Indian Ocean and conferences have addressp.o the various
events occurring therein and the.ir significanc@ to the united
Statps. Similarly a vast number of recommp.ndations have
cmergca concerning possible courses of action for the United
Sta'tes in the Indian Ocean. Suggestions have ranged from
"doing nothing" to maintaining a strong naval presence or
fleet in the region. Principal reasons for this sudden atten-
tion in the United States were the announced British plans in
1967 of removal of her military forces from the ~ndian Ocean
area coupled with the immediate proJection of a Soviet naval
presence into the region. These events seemed to be the
catalyst which has awakened United states efforts to identify
and evaluate its interests in the Indian Ocean, caused much
speculation about possible Soviet intentions in that area and
suggested that a more definitive United States policy needs
to be formulated in order to effectively direct its act.ions
in the Indian Ocean.
United States interests in the Indian Ocean are depicted
as follows:
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1. Promote peace aad stability throughout the area
2. ~ncourage eeonomic growth in the lit~oral states
3. Insure that lines of communication and freedom of
transportntion (shipping) on the seas are not threatened
4. Provide economic and military assistance to speci-
fied states
5. Abide by United States corrunitments which exist in
the area
6. Insure protection of U.S. investments> both mili-
tary and economic> and citizens in the region
7. Seek a settlement to the Arab/Israeli conflict
8. Prevent domination of the region by any singl~
external or internal state
9. Maintain unhindered access to vital, raw r.1aterials
of the region by U.S. allies, primarily Western Europe
10. Seek a reduction in tension and an improvement in
relations between India and Pakistan.
Many of these interests are very general and apply to the
other areas of the world as well as the Indian Ocea~l. Othe r'
interests are more definitive, and specific U.S. actions ca:n
be associated with them. A few of the more specific U.S.
interests will be enumerated in the following paragraph.
United Sta'tes oil companies have developed most of the
oil production capability in the Persian Gulf area, and
currently possess concession rights to about sixty percent
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•of the Middle East oil reserves. 45 Economic aid is provided
to many of the littoral states, with the largest amounts
allotted to Israel, Iran, Pakistan, India, Thailand and
Indonesia. Major arms agreements were conclud~d with Israel,
Iran, Pakistan, Thailand and Australia during the years 1966-
1970. Military inv0stments exist, primarily in the ~arm af
communicatiens stations and a small Middle East Force (MEF).
The United States is a party to a number of multilateral and
bilateral agreements with particular states in tht: Indian
Ocean. Each of these specific ~Qterests will be discuss@d in
greater detail in the following section.
Specific. Oil is probably the most direct United StQtes
interest in the Indian Ocean, an interest which mate~ialized
in the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf region. American oil
interest is not presently that of a consumer, but prircarily
that of an investor, for the United states only purchases
about six percent of its oil from the Middle EAst. The oil
investments, however, provide the United States with about
1.5 billion dollars annually, which helps partially to offset
46
the existing balance of payment deficit.
llilited States oil companies own sizable percentages of
the major Persian Gulf oil producing companies. "TabJ.e XIX
is a s~~ation of the major oil company holdings in this r0-
gion. The figures reveal that United States companies own
47.5 percent of Iraq Petroleum Company, 49 percent of Iran-
ian Consortium, 100 percent of Arabian American Oil Company
and 50 percent of Kuwait Oil Company. The Jow production
costs, high market price in the United States and favorable
tax conditions make oil investments most beneficial to ~he
oil companies and the U. S. Government. 47 Thus the immediat,.
interest of oil to the United States is one o~ investment
return.
Since the ~iddle East possesses approximately sixty-two
percent of the world's proven oil reserves, a long-term
interest of unrestricted access to this oil also exists.
The degree of importance attached to this interest is de-
pendent on U.S. 011 policy, domestic oil production and' the
future exploitation of other oil reserves, such as those in
Alaska. Present oil consumption in North America is about
sixteen million barrels per day, with an annual growth rate
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of four percent. A continued rise in consumption, may
increase the importance of Middle East oil to the United
states consumer in the long run.
An indirect interest to the United states is the afore-
mentioned importance of Middle East oil to the countries of
Western Rurope and Japan. If this source of all was lost
to them, the economic repercussions would probably be con-
siderable. Depending upon the cirGUffistances surrounding
such an interruption, a con~rontation of states would lik0.1y
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occur. As an ally and friend of Japan and Western Europe
states , United Stat(;s involv(;ment would certe.inl.y occu"r.
Since the end of World War II, the Ur.ited States has
consistently provided foreign aid to developing countries.
Since 1945, more than twenty billion dollars in foreign
grants a~d credits were dispensp,d to the littoral states of
the Indian Ocean. India and Pakistan received more than
twelve billion dollars, while Indonesia, Egypt, Israel, and
Iran ottlfined about one biLlion dollars each. During the
years 1966-1970, the principal recipients of U.S. aid in
descending order were: India, Pakistan., Indonesia, Iran,
~ustralia, Thailand, Israel and Jordan. 49
More specifically, the United states assisted the Somali
Republic With improvement of its port facilities at Chisimaio
in 196r. However, United States influence in Somalia has
declined in recent years, and Peace Corps workers were asked
to depart in October 1969.50 Ethiopia has recp.ivp.d continu-
ous aid from the United States, especially in the form of
military equipment and advice. Although Iran was d2clared
a developed country in 1964, United States aid resumed in
1965 and totalled 165 million dollars for the years 1969 and
1970. Despite United States support of Israel and cond'emna-
tion ·oy the UAH, Ameriean relations with three Arab states,
Saud~ Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan remain friendly. The United
States maintains firmly established oil interests in Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait, while Jordan continuously receives for-
eign aid. Since the Communist purge in Indonesia in 1965,
United states aid to that state has increased each year,
""1
amounting to 18g million dollars in 1970. J
United states interests are further evident in the form
of commitments, primarily those of multilateral and bilateral
agTeements. Although these commitments vary in scope, they
obligate the United S~ates to retain sufficient capabilities
to fulfill each agreement.
The specific multilateral agreements are the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Australian, New Zealand,
United States (ANZUS) treatip.s, both of indefinite duration
but permitting one year 1 s notice of withdrawal, and provid-
ing for mutual defiense in the event any pestic ipant is sub-
ject to armed attack. 52 SEATO has grown significantly weakGr
over time, with France and Pakistan seldom partic.ipating in
any events. Other members are Britain, Australia, Thailand~
New Zealand and the Philippines. The United States is an
active participant in SEATO exercises, although fewer were
conducted during recent years.
Central Treaty Organi~ation (CENTO), which consists of
Turkey, Britain, Iran and Pakistan, is renewed every five
years and requires six months notice of withdrawal. The mem-
be's pledgea mutual cooperation for security and defense
7'7
against direct or indirect aggression. The United states is
not a memoer of CENTO, but serves as an advisor, and occa-
sionally participates in naval exercises, particularly with
Iran and Britain.
Principal bilateral agreements involve the United states
with Ethiopia, Australia, Thailand and Britain. Particulars
of each pact are as follows: a defense assistance agreement
with Ethiopia., in effect until 1978, and permitting operation
of a communications sta,tion at Asmara; establishment oj' a
communications station at North West Cape, Australia, through
1988; a fifty year agreement with Britain, si~ned in 1966,
which provides for joint use of British Indian Ocean Terri-
tory (BlOT) for defense purposes; and an indefinite pact
wi th Thailand, reaffirming lithe "independence and integrity
of Thailand as vital to U.S. national interests and to world
peace."53
In early April 1971, a United States Naval Construction
Battalion Detachment arrived at Diego Garcia'. a small four-
teen by five mile atoll which is part of the Chagos Archi-
pelago. The island is located about one thousand miles south,
southwest of the southern tip of India and two thousand miles
northeast of Madagascar. The stated purpose, according to
naval sources, for the construction force on Diego Garcia is
to build Tl a communications relay station, i\Ti th an airfield
to make it accessible. n54 Estimated cost of the project,
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which should be completed by 1974, is nineteen millioll 001-
lars. '1'he station will increasE:' conunurlications coverage in
an area of ~he world where the United states has a relatively
limited capability. It will also serve as a back-up station
to the existing U.S. Kagnew COlJ'.Jllunications Station located
at Asmara, Rthiopia, Which serves as a global relay and
intelligence listening post. Th@ Unite States also manns a
very low frequency cormnu.nications station at North West Cape:
Australia, the primary purpose of which is to support U.S.
submarinps.55 When it becomes operational, the Diego Gqrcia
station will bE' manned by a joint United states/Britis}) team,
primarily U.S. Navy personnel, totaling about 250 persons.
Doth U.S. and British flags will fly ovp.r the station, which
will probably b~ commanded by a U.S. naval officer.
The construction of this "sustere communications facll-
ity,1l by which it is usually referred, is the result of a
U.S./British agreement signed in 1966 and exter:dine; for fifty
;:/,e a rs .
Present support facilities at the atoll are very limited.
i\Then completed, the runway will 'be eiGht thousand feet long
:::l.'ld able to accornmodat@ most U.S. aircraft. I'ort facilities
are practically r:onexistent, With no berthing capability for
Ships. Consequently most supplies will have to be delivered
by air. Some fuel storage facilities are planned, with con-
r:ections 'being installAd to permit aviation fuel and fuel oil
56for ships to be pumped ashore.
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Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the investment
at Diego Garcia is its potential for the future. It is cen-
trally located in the Indian Ocean, at distances within
reach of many Afr~can, Asian, and Australian airfields.
Appl'Irently th~ atoll's inlet could be developed through
")7dredging to provide fifty square miles of anchorage space.-
Since 19~8, the United StateS has maintai!"led a Middle
East Force (MEF) , designated MIDRASTFOR, at the British port
facili ties in Bahrain. 'l'he force consists of a converted
seaplane tender, U.S.S, Valcour (AGF-l), and two destroyers.
This force represents the total permanent U.S. naval pres-
enee in the Indian Ocean. Over the years the MEF has made:
hundreds of port visits to eastern Africa and South Asia
states. It has regularly participated in CENTO exercises
with Britain and Iran. Its primary purpose is to maintain
a low level U.S. presence throughout the region, essentially
serving as a stabilizing force. More specifically, the main
:f'unctions of the MEF are: "Showing the flag; protection and
assistance of U.S. merchant shipping and maintenance of free
passage in international waterways; evacuation operations;
administration of military assistance programs; and communi-
cations and intelligence activities. ,,58
From a military capability viewpoint, the f'.1EF is very
limited. It perhaps serves as a partial deterrent, hut cer-
tainly would not hinder any sizable force it might encounter.
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The ME,F has represented the United states in the Persian Gulf
and adjacent areas for the last twenty-four years. It does
represent a visible U.S, presence, admittedly small; and
reveals to the states of that area a continuing American
presence. Whether 0[' not the tvf.EF should be enlarged, modern-
ized, relocated, removed or left as is, are options which
must be addressed in light of the changing situation which
presently exists in the Indian Ocean.
Since earJ.y 1971, United States naval involvement in
the Indian Ocean has increased. BeginnIng in March, con-
struction work, previously described, began on th0. communi-
cations station at Diego Garcia. In April 1971, four days
of antisubmarine warfare exercises were conductpd in the
southeastern Indian Ocean by six ships, four destroyers, a
submarine and the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Ticonderoga
(CVS_14).59 From 10 July to 22 .July 1971, the U.S.S 1'ruxtun
(DLGN-35), a nuclear-powered frigate, conducted a twelve day~
eight thousand mile journey tllroughout the Indian Ocean. The
Ship departed Subic Bay in the Philippines, transited the
Strait of' Ma1acca, and followed a track toward the Maldive
Islands., around the Seycl:.elles Island group and terminated
at Perth, Australia. The average speed of the ship was
aeaut thirty knots, and demonstrated the ability of a nu-
60
clear-powered ship to cover er~at distances at high speeds"
In September, the nuclear carrier U.S.S. Enterprise (CVAN- 65)
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ano nuclear frigate U.S.S. Bainbridge (DLGN-25) conducted
a four day cruise in the Andaman Sea. Prime Minister
McMahon announced in November that he had been informed by
Secretary of Defense Laird that U.S. naval forces would con-
duct intermittent cruises in thE: Indian Ocean to 1!cDunter-
balar-c re:!1 Soviet naval power therein. Mr. ~cMahon said that ~
United States ships and planes would be welcome
to use the repair and refueling facilities at
the Cockburn Sound Naval Base ano Learmonth Air
Station in Western Austra1ia~6l
From 14 December 1971, to 10 January 197~, the navy
operated a nine Ship task force in the north central Indian
Ocean. The purpose of the task force operation was related
to the India/Pakistan conflict, and will be discussed in the
following section.
The United States Navy intends to modernize the Middle
East Force, stationed in Bahrain, by replacing the aged flag-
ship Valcour with the U.S.S. LaSalle (LPD-3), an amphibious
transport ship. While not increasing the size of the force~
the LaSalle provides an increased capability to the ~lliF,
I
particularly in amphibious warfare. Similarly the (~ited
States concluded an executive agreement with Bahrain on
23 December 1971, permitting the MEr' to continue using some
of the facilities of the former British base in Bahrair-. 62
The general trend portrayed by these events and reite-
rated by government spokesmen is that the United States will
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not maintain a sizable permanent naval presence in the In-
dian Ocean, but rather conduct more frequent operations and
port visits in the area by navy ships. Such operations will
reaffirm U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean arE:: a , but at il




POTr~NTIAL UNITED STATES/SOVIET UNION CONFRONTATIONS
The potential for external power confrontations docs
exist in the Indian Ocean. The interests of each of the
external power states were previously described. Many of
these interests interact and over'lap with one another. Al-
though each encounter cannot be identified, three modes of
co~frontation between the United states and Soviet Union
will be discussed. The first involves economic and political
competition via aid and assistance programs, the second re-
veals the effects of an internal event, and the third sum-
marizes strategic competition between th~ two superpowers.
Aid and Assistance Competition. United states and Soviet
assistance programs in the Indian Ocean during recp.nt years
have confronted each other in a number of instances. The
most obvious examplp is Soviet aid to the Arab states (pri-
marily Egypt) and United States assistance to Israel. SinCe
thE: six day war in June 196'(, Russia and the United States
have prOVided substantial amounts of military assistance to
their respective benefactors. Although no subspquent war
has occurred .• a number of skirmishes have been fOUGht _' tl1f2
tension between the participants has not been reduced, and
efforts to secure a peaceful settlement have not been s~c­
cessf'ul.
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During recp.nt years, Russian aid to Somalia increased,
while United States assistance decreased. Each state assiated
SQJlalia v'li th improvements to its port facilities, the UYli ted
States in Chisimaio and the Soviets in Berbera and Mogadishu.
The United, States Peace Corp was asked to leave in 1969.
Soviet milita,ry personnel are now advisina and materially
supporting Somalian military fox'ces. Soviet influence is
presently at a relatively high level compared to Un:ited
states influence.
Since 1970, Russian and Ethiopian relations have im-
proved. Soviet aid was offered and accepted by Ethiopia.
'J'he United states has provided aid to Ethiopia since the
early 19508 and the Ethiopian military forces rece1ve equip-
mGnt and advice from the Ullited Stat8s. Ethiopian and Ameri-
can relations are still very ~ood.
A similar situation exists in Iran, where Soviet aid
and assistance was initiated in 1966. United! states aid was
reduced in the middle 19608 especially when the Un"ted States
declared that Iran was now considered a developed country.
/\s noted, Soviet aid was immediately forthcoming and subse-
quently U.S. aid resumed and has ir..creased continually since
1967.
Soviet and United States competition also exists in India
and Pakistan. Pri,or to the India/Pakistan war in December
1971-, the United States 19as supplytng Pakistan with economic
[)S
and military aid while giving economic aid to India but re-
jecting its plea for military aid. 1 Russia was happy to
supply India with military aid~ and is assisting India in
modernizing its navy and port facilities. The Soviets have
also provided assistance to Pakistan.
Briefly summarizing~ the aid competition between the
United States and Russi.a in the Indian Ocean primarily exists
in the Northwest~ Arabian Sea/Persian Gulf and Northern In-
dian Ocean regions. Soviet aid is the newer input in most
states, and Russian influence seems to have benefited from
these investments. United S~ates influence has not suffered
much in states such as Ethiopia and Iran, but it has d creased
relative to the Soviet pOSition in India. The Arab/Israeli
confrontation remains the most sensitive situation in the
area. Neither side is amenable to a settleme~t except on
its own terms. Since the United States and Soviet Union
back opposite sides, continuous tension between the principal
parties affords aD c:ver present opportunity for an United
States/Soviet encolinteru
Internal Event Effects. During the India/Pakistan war
in December 1971, the United States and Soviet Union sup-
ported opposite sides. During the buildup phase preceding
the war, the United states provided arms to Pakistan While
Russia greatly increased its supply of military equipment
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'to India. On 13 December 1971~ the United states sent a
nine ship task force from the South China Sea toward the
Indian Ocean. The force consisted of the aircraft caTrier
Enterprise, amphibious assault ship U.S.S. Tripoli (LPU-lO)
and a few guided missile destroyers and support ships. The
task force entered the Bay of Bengal on 15 December, and
proceed~d northwest toward East Pakistan. The purpose for
sending the task force into the Indian Ocean was never
clearly revealed, although the state Department said that
the Ships were prepared to evacuate American citizens in
2
East Pakistan if such action became necessary. Few people
really accepted this explanation as the sale reason for
sending the force into the Indian Ocean. Further cxplana-
tions were not providpd, but through a combination of skp.tchy
press releases, individual leaks to columnists, d~duction,
and speculation, the following consensus about the purposes
for the task force evolved:
1) To serve as a deterrent to any further mili-
tary plans against West Pakistan by forcing
India to divert ships and planes away from
military operations
2) To demonstrate United States strength and
fleXibility to both Russia and India
3) To serve as a response to the existing and
increasing Soviet naval presence in the
Indian Ocean
4\ To evacuate United States citizens i~
I Pakistan if require~.3
The Soviet naval presence reportedly consis-ted of sixteen
ships in the Indian Ocean when the war started, and increased
to about twenty-two ships when the U.S. task force entered
the area. 67 Thus the potential for confrontation beti'recn
the United ,States and Soviet Union certainly existed in the
Indian Ocean, as naval forc;es of each cour:.try maneuvered in
a sensitive area of conflict between two littoral s.tateS.
China also supported Pakistan in its war with India.
Talk of diversionary moves, by China to decrease Indian pres-
sure on Pakistan, and by Russia to offset any move by China,
reemphasized the disagreements and potential border clashes
between those states.
The U.S. task force, which remained south of India dur-
ing most of its Indian Ocean assignment, departed the area
on 10 ,January 1972. An estimated fifteen to tWE,nty Soviet
ships were still in the Indian Ocean at that time. 5
\>lho won the battle for influence? India won the war,
and as the supporter of India., the Soviet Union will probably
benefit from its role. The Russians will likely receive in-
creased Indian support for their Indian Ocean presence. Rus-
sia can also expect preferred treatment at Indian naval
facilities for support of its SbipS.6 The Soviet Union in-
creased its prestige in many of the littoral states, thereby
strengthening its ability to limit and counter any Chinese
overtures in the Indian Ocean.
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Un~ted States influence suff~red, but only the futurp.
will Dermit an accurate assessment of the effect upon A~eri-
L
can influence. Perhaps the setback is a blessing to the
United states, for it may initiate a thorough analysis of
American interests in the Indian Ocean and result in the
formulation of a definitive Indian Ocean policy.
Strategic Footholds. It was previously mentionod that
the _ndian Ocean has received increased attention since 1968
because of two events: announced Britisb. withdrawal £rom
east of Suez and introduction of Soviet naval ac~ivity into
the area in 1968. Soviet and U.S. interests in the Indian
Ocean were depicted. From a geographical point of view, the
Indian Ocean is a greater national security interest to the
Soviet Union than to the united States. United States bal-
listie missile submarines can launch missi.les CJ.gainst both
Russian and Chinese terri~ory from the Indian Ocean. Con-
versely, Soviet forces in the Indian Ocean arp. not a direct
threat to U.S. territory, but rather a potential threat to
various American interests therein.
The United States maintains a low level military pres-
encE' in the Indian Ocean. Th€ MEF conducts numorous port
visits, participates in joint exercises with other naval
forces in the area and is accepted throughout the area by
most of the littoral states.
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The United States also possesses two communications
facilities in the area and is building a third. U.S. forces
can use base facilities in Australia and South Africa, and
repair and replenishment facilities in Singapore. LeSser
port facilities are availablco throughout -the Indian Ocean
to U.S. ships for replenishmE..nt and port visits. Recent
sta~cments by Defense Department spokesmen indicate that
r'.avy ships will operate more frequently in the Indian Ocean
in the future. 7
The United States naval patter.n in the Indian Ocear-
appears to be as follows: establish the nec .ssary facili-
ties in the .area to support periodic naval operations; mini-
mize the offensiveness of these facilities to the lit-toral
states; and conduct more frequent naval aetivities in the
Indian Ocean to reaffirm United States interests therein.
Increased attention to the Indian Ocean area by the
Soviet Union, demonstrated by the visible presence of the
Soviet Navy, has introduced a new variable into the Indian
Ocean. Reduction of British foraes in the Indian Ocean has
focused attention upon the Soviet presence. Particularly
important to the United States are the capabilities and
intentions which arc represented by this new variable, and
their effect in the future on U.S. interests.
&lthough varying in size, the Soviet Union maintains a
year-round naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Fishing,
go
oceanographic, space tracking and combat vessels represent
trw Russians throughout l:le area. Soviet ships usc numerous
port facilities in ttle Indial'. Ocean, particularly those in
the northwest and northern regions. The Russians anchored
Mooring buoys at various locations in the Indian Ocean. The
Soviet Union is expected to continue its E-i'f'orts to obtaiT::
air and naval facilities in various countries such as Somalia,
PDR of Yemen, India, Ceylon and Bangladesh. As the Russians
continue their naval programs :i.n the; Indian Ocean and the
United states increases i ts activities.'J the likelihood 01' an
encounter increases.
T'h~ Uni tGd states and Soviet Union both possess spe·clfic
interests in the Indian Ocean. A variety of' methods is 12.'·m-
ployed by each nation in support of its interests. As both
states pursue their respective interests, the potential for
confrontation increases. Although confrontations will occur,
cor..i'licts need not necessarLl.y follow. The pattern at pres-
ent appears as follows: the Soviet Union seeks to estab-
lish a presence in the Indian Ocean while the: United States
strives for a capability therein.
']" e United states needs to analyz8 the interests J in-
vc'stments and operR.ting methods oi' itse:lf' and the Soviet
Union in the Indian Ocean area. The magnitude 8.nd purpose
of current U.S. efforts in the Indian Oc~an must be evalu-
at~d. The analysis must io r2ntify existing or d8veloping
91
tr nds which are likely to cause confrontations between the
two countries. A clear, definitive U.S. policy, which
enunciates U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean, must be
'formulated. Only then can courses of action.:' whtch ef'fE'c-
tively utilize Amet'ican rC?sources, be pursued to achievE'
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250 run east of 6,500,000
Mozambique,
Africa
480 nm east of 800,000
Malagasy Republic





900 nm north of 58,000
Mauritius
1000 nm south 1,400
of India
400 nm SW of 106,000
Ceylon
200 run west of
southern India
120 run EN'~ of
NE coast of
Somalia
50 nm SE of 11,200,000
southern tip
of India
325 run 8i1 of
Rangoon
180 run ~l of
Sumatra








































Source: Nation Geographic Society, National Geoeraphic
Atlas of the World (Washington: 1970), v.p.
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TABLE II




Name States Location (nm) (ft)




st. of Hormuz Iran/Oman Entrance 21 54
to Per-
sian Gulf
St. of Malacca Indonesia/ Between 8 15
Malaysia Malaysia
and Sumatra
Bunda Strait Indonesia Between Java 12 18
and Sumatra
Lombok Strait Indonesia Betwc;en Bali 11 600
and Lombok
Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intc;lligence
and Research, sovereignt; of the Sea (Washington: U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1969), p. 2 , 27.
III
TABLE III
GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS AND RP.LATED PRIMARY











































































1ffiSTERN INDIAN OCEAN REGION IN70RVffiTION
State/ Area2 Affilia'tions/T'erritory Population (mi) Capital Economy status Dependence
So. Africa 19,167,000 471,443 Pretoria Mining (Gold) Hepublic Britain
Industry
Tliool




















rrerritory Population (mi)2 Capital Economy Status Dependence
Seychelles 58,000 Victoria Copra British Britain
Is. (Nohe Island) Cinna.mon Crown
Vanilla Colony






La Reunion 457,000 90 St. Denis Perfume French France
oils Overseas
Territory
I-' BlOT 1,400 175 -- British Britainf--"
\Jl ( seasonal) Crown
Colony
SO"J.rce:
(\'l as hingt on,
National Geographic Society, National Geographic Atlas of the World
:c. C.: 19'(0), v. p. ~
TABLE V




Ter~itQry (nm) (nm) Prineiu~ Ports Ocean Usage Navy Air
Bot\oers (31)
F'ight2rs (L~O)





















Tanzania 12 669 ~ar es Salaa:-n
Zan7-.ibar








































Sources; Louis l". E. Goldie ~ !'International LaTIJ of' the Sea--A Revie'N of States 1
Offshore Claims and CO!T~petences~!: Naval War College Review~ February 1972, p. 65,66;
Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1971-1972 (London: 1971), v.p.;
National Council on Iv1arir.:e Resources and Engineering Development~ )~arine Science
Activities of the Nations of' Africa (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., April 1968)~
v.p.; U.S. DepartMent of ~tate, Sovereignty of the Sea (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print.
Off.~ October J969), p. 28, 29.
TABLE VI
NOR'I'mmST INDIAN OCEAN HBGIOI\ INFORl/"lI,TION
State/ Area2 Affiliation/Territory Popl.J-lation ( mi) capital Economy status De~er.dence
Egypt 33~900~000 383,660 Cairo Cotton Republic Soviet Union
Wheat
Oil
Sudan l5~800~000 967 .. 495 Khartoum Gum Arabic Republic
Cotton
Ethiopia 25,OOO~000 471~776 Addis Coffee Constitu- United States
Ababa Cereals tional
f-J Lt. Indus. Monarchy).....J
CD
Somali 2,800,000 246,200 Mogadi- Livestock ~cpublic Soviet Unio11.
Republic shu Bananas
Corn
Afars 125,000 8,494 Djibouti Dates French France
Issas J_ivestock Overseas
Shipping Territory
Israel 2,900,000 7,992 Jerusalem Industry Republic United States
Lt. Agri.
Mining
Jo:rdan 2,300,000 3'7,737 Amman Lt. Indus. Republic
Lt. Agri.
Source: National C"eograp~lic Society, !:(ational Geographic Atlas of the Horld
(Washington, D.C.: 1970), v.p.
TABLE VIr






















Fishing 12 Subs 600 Fighter/
Offshore Oil 15 DD Type Bombers
Viar. Sci. ]2 Patrol
Port Facoi.l. 66 Coastal
Fishing 6 Patrol 16 Fighters
Oil Explora- Boats 16 Bombers
tion 2 Coastal
F'lshi:r.g 11 Patrol 25 Bombers









































b Gulf of Ao_aba
Sources: Louis F. E. Goldie, IlInternational LavJ of the Sea--A Review of' States'
Offshore Claims and Competences," Naval -Illar College Revie1.\l,., February 1972, p. 65, 66;
Institute for Strategic Studies, The f,:ilitary Balance 1971-1972 (London: 1971):> v.p.;
:lTa tional Council on Marine ResQurdes and Engineering Development, Ivrarine Science
Activities of the :-Yations of. Africa (1'!ashington: u. S. Govt. Print. Orf., April 1968),
v.p.; U.S. Department of State, Sovereignty of the Sea, (\-Jashir.,gton: ~J.S. Gcvt. Print.
Off., October 1969), p. 28, 29·
TABLE VITI
POTENTIAL LOSS/GAIN POSSIBILITIES FROM








Strengthen Middle East Influence
Provide shorter water route to
Indian Ocean
Probably recover some lost
territory
Source of income from shipping





Reduction in Middle East ten-
sions
Lower tanker rat~s
Expansion of Soviet naval
presence
Reduction in likelihood of war
Possible loss of east bank of
Su.ez Oanal
Source: "Bchind the Pressure to Reopen Suez Canal,T1
u. S. News and World RE:;_port, 19 Apr,i 1971, p. 35.
TABLE IX
_!l.RAGIN~PENTNSUI~.A/PE:RSIj\NGULF BEG ION INFORNATION
State/ Area2 Affiliations/Territory Population (mi) Capital Economy status Dependence
Saudi _~rabia 7-,700~OOO 830,000 Riyadh Oil Monarchy Uni ted Stat.es
Dates
Yemen 5, '700,000 75,290 Sar..'a Coffee Republic
Hides
Peoples Demo- 1,300,000 111,075 Aden Cotton Republic RusBia
cratic Repub- Dried Fish China
lie of Yemen




Union of Arab 180,000 350 -- Oil Union Britain
Emirates stamps
Bahrain 200,000 231 Manama Oil Indepen- Britain
dent
Qatar 100,000 8,500 Doha Oil Indepen- Britain
dent
































Source: National Geographic Society, National Geographic Atlas of the World








(nm) (TIm) ?rincipal Ports Ocean Usage Navy Air














lic of Yenen 12 654 Aden
Oman 3 1005 >':uscat
U~'1io:c of
Arab E;.lirates h'?o Dabai







































12 Patrol 220 Fighter
Boats Bombers
13 Coastal






\51 SoUTces: Louis F.E. Goldie, IlInternational Law of the Sea--A Revie1f.r of States 1
Offsf'_ore Claims and Competences,ll Naval ':Iar College rtevie'o'I, February 1972, p. 65, 66;
Ins titute for Strategic Studies, The ;,,!il-i tary Balance 1971-1972 (London: 1971), v. p. ;
"National Council on l'1ari::1e Resources and Engineering De\re1oprnent, lvjarine Science
Activities of the Nations of the Near East and South Asia (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., A?ril 1968), v.p.; U.S. Department of state, Sovereignty of the Sea (Washington:
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., October 1969), p. 28,29.
'rABLE XI

















Source: Charles Issawi, "The Politics and Fconorr:ics
of' National Resources," Unpublished Paper, U.S. Department
of State, FAR 13610 (Washington: 1971), p. 3.
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TABLE XII









1966 1967 1968 1969










119.4 129.2 141.1 148 v 6 176.2 220
72.3 84.3 126.0 11.~9.8 160.1 1)~·2
114.4 li5 v 2 122.1 129.5 137. 5 11~6
68. 0 60 .1 74. 0 74 v 9 76 .. 9 81.1·






























































Source: The Economist Int 11igence Unit Limitr:d, Quarterly
Economic Review Oil in the Middle East Annual Su 1ement
London: 19 1 ~ p. 3.
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TABI,E', XIII
OIL REVENUES OF 'T'EB MIDDLE EAST STA'I'_~:S
(million dollars)
Country 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Saudi Arabia 655 7'77 852 966 1008 1200
Libya 371 476 631 952 1132 1295
Iran 522 593 737 817 938 1076
Kuwait 671 707 718 766 812 897
Iraq 375 394 361 4'76 483 513
Abu Dhabi 3L~ 100 106 153 191 231
Qatar 66 90 100 109 118 122
Oman 4 61 92 107
Bahrain 18 19 19 19 19
43
Dubai 2
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, Quarterly
Economic Review, Oil in the Middle East, l\nnual Supplement(London: 1971 ) , p. 28.
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TABLE XIV















Source: Charles Issawi J TlThe Politics and Econor.1ics of
Na tional Resources J!T Unpublished Paper, U. S. Department of
state, FAR 13610 (Washington: 1971), p. 6.
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TABU' XV
NORTtffiRN I?illIAN OCEAN REGION 1)~Om!iliTION
state/ Area Affiliations/
Territory _ Population _(rni)2 Capital Economy Status j2eQendence


















































aInland Waters Defined According to Archipelago Theory.
Source: National Geographic Soc iety, National Geographic Atlas of the "vorld
(WaShington, D.C.: 1970), v.p.
TABLE XVI















































C:1i ttagong Fishtng Unk. Un}~ •
Sources: Louis F.E. Goldie, r~International Law of the Sea--A Review o:f states I Of:fshcre
Claims and Competence~,ll rIaval IlIaI' Col1e-,2 Review, February 1972, p. 65, 66; lns·titute f')y Stra-
tegic Studies, The r·'iili'tary Balance 1971-1972 ,London: 1971), v.p.; National Council on J"'1arine
Resources and Engineering Development, ~arine Science Activities o:f the Nations of Africa
('l,<lashington: U. S. Govt. Print. Off., April 1968), v.p.; 1]. S. Department of State, Sovereignty





EASTERN INDIAN OCF.AN REGION INFO~ffiTION
State! Area Affiliations/
Territory Population (mi)2 Capital Economy Status Depe~den.ce
:1 Burma 27,700,000 261,739 Rangoon Rice Republic:tma~ Teak
r-.fining
Sou,] I Thailand t 36,200,000 198,456 3angkok Tin Constitu- United Statres
--., ;
- Rubher I tional SEATOlingi , .. (' .~. Ii - --L •• , 1> Monarchy
!--'
vJ Malaysia 10 .• 800,000 125,430 Kuala Rubber Par1iamen- 3ritishI\)
Lampur Tin tar;y ANZUK
Rice Federation (Commonwealth)
Sine;apore 2,017,000 224 Singapore ']I'rade Republic Bri"tisr:
Center ANZUK( Commom.;rea1 th)
Indonesia 121,200,000 575,893 Djakarta Oil Republic
Rubber
Tin









Territor;r (nm~ (nm) Principal Ports Ocean Usag8 Na.vy Air
BUrTLa 12 1230 Rangoon Fishing 1 DL 18 Fighter/
89 Patrol/ BombGrs
Coastal
Thailand 12 1299 None Fisbing 4 DL/DD lLj·4 Fighter/




'- 1853 Port Swettenham 3J Fighter/.,... Jvlalaysia 12 Fishing 2 DL(440 ) Penang 34 Patrol/ Borr.bers
Nalacca Coasta
SL'1gapore 3 28 Singapor,e Shipp'ing 3 Patrol 36 Fighter/
Building Boats Bombers
Repair 1 Coastal
Indonesia Arc~ipelago 19,784 Fishing l2 S-~bs 122 Fighter/
Theory Oil 1 C~ BaIT_bel's
(12 ) 15 DL/DD
145 Mi.x
Australia 3 13,971 Perth Fishing h Subs 19 Fighter/
Fremantle 1 CIT Bombers

















Sources: Louis F.E. Goldie, "International Law of the Sea--A Review of States' Offshore
Claims and competeroces,'1 :Naval 'war College :8.eview, February 197?, p. 65" 66 ; Institute for
Strategic Studies, The :<ilitary Balance 1971-1972 (London: 1971), v.p.; Na.tional GouDci1 on
Marine Resources and Engineering Development, Marine Science Activities of the ~ations of
East Asia (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., April 1968), v.p.; u.s. Department of State,
Sovereignty of the Sea (1'Jashington: OJ. S. Govt. Print. Orf., October 1969);: p. 28, 29.
f
TABLE XIX
CO~POSITION OF PREDOMINANT OIL PRODUCING COMPANIRS





Near East Development Corporation
(Standard Oil, New Jersey, and Mobil)
Compagnie Francaise des Pet roles
Participation and Explorations Corporation
(Gulbenkian)
Iran Oil Participants (Consortium)
British Petroleum
Shell
Standard Oil (New Jersey)
Mobil
Standard Oil of California
Texaco
Gulf
Compagnie Francaise des Pet roles
Iricon
ARAMCO (Arabian Ame-rican Oil Company)
Standard Oil (New Jersey)
Mobil



























Source: T.B. Millar, The Indian an~ Pacific Oceans:
Some Strat~ ic Considerations (London: Institute for Stra-


























~ational Geographic Society, ~ational Geographic Atlas of the World
~.C.: 1970), v.p.
